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Freedom to Discriminate: Assessing
the Lawfulness and Utility
of Biased Broadband Networks
Rob Frieden*
ABSTRACT

This Article assesses the potential for harm to broadband
consumers and competitors when Internet service providers (ISPs) tier
service by combining so-called "unlimited usage" with reduced video
image resolution and also by not metering usage when subscribers
ISPs previously generated no
access specific content sources.
regulatory concerns when they developed different tiers of service and
price points based on content transmission speeds and monthly
allotment of data consumption.
However, recent "zero rating" and "unlimited"data offers have
triggered questions as to whether ISPs engage in unlawful paid
prioritization of certain traffic from specific sources or in traffic
degradation by receiving high-definition video content but delivering it
with lower line resolution. Additional questions examine whether ISPs
engage in detrimental traffic throttling by slowing traffic delivery
speeds when subscribers exceed a monthly downloading threshold or
when high-volume subscribersseek service in a congested area.
This Article further assesses the lawfulness of zero rating and
video line-resolution degradation based on the two most recent sets of
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) rules that treat ISPs as
telecommunications service providers subject to common carrier
regulation, as well as rules that now reclassify broadbandaccess as an
information service. This Article concludes that even though ISPs have
self-serving, profit-maximizing goals when enhancing or degrading
content carriageand display, such practices can have positive spillover
effects that enhance consumer welfare without significantly harming
competition in the marketplace of ideas and Internet commerce.
Acknowledging the potential for harmful arrangements, this Article
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I
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also recommends that the FCC and other national regulatory
authorities implement a speedy and fair complaint resolution process
to remedy content carriagedisputes.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The
Federal
Communications
Commission
(FCC
or
"Commission") recently passed an initiative that substantially reduces
the scope and nature of broadband network regulation and largely
permits broadband carriers to operate biased, nonneutral networks.'
Framing its new rules and policies as restoring Internet freedom, the
FCC envisions a broadband access marketplace-operating largely
free of ex ante rules, requirements, and restrictions-based on the
conclusion that the broadband marketplace operates competitively

1.
See Restoring Internet Freedom, No. 17-108, 2018 WL 305638 (Jan. 4, 2018)
[hereinafter
Restoring
Internet
Freedom
Order],
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatclFCC-17-166A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/G4R5-XULS]; see also Restoring Internet
Freedom, 83 Fed. Reg. 7852 (Feb. 22, 2018) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pts. 1, 8, 20); Restoring
Internet Freedom, 32 FCC Red. 4434 (May 23, 2017) [hereinafter Restoring Internet Freedom
NPRM].
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2
and that carriers lack incentives to harm competition and consumers.
The Commission has removed common carrier regulatory safeguards
by reclassifying broadband Internet access as an information service
subject to loose oversight that the Commission itself can opt largely to
eschew.3
While offering no empirical proof, the FCC concludes with
certainty that deregulation of broadband networks will remove
impediments to freedom caused by regulatory burdens imposed by an
earlier Commission ruling that treated broadband access as a
telecommunications service subject to Title II of the Communications
Act of 1934.4 The Commission assumes that, by removing what it
considers heavy-handed and obsolete public-utility regulation, the
broadband marketplace will operate more robustly once freed of
disincentives for investment, innovation, and employment.5

2.

Restoring Internet

Freedom Order,

supra note 1, at *1-2; Restoring Internet

Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4441 ("Between enactment of the Telecommunications Act [in
1996] and the 2015 adoption of the Title II Order, the free and open Internet flourished:
Providers invested over $1.5 trillion to construct networks; high-speed Internet access
proliferated at affordable rates; and consumers were able to enjoy all that the Internet had to
offer. In 2015, the Commission abruptly departed from its prior posture and classified broadband
Internet access service as a telecommunications service subject to public-utility regulations
under Title II.").
Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4435-36 ("Today, we take a
3.
much-needed first step toward returning to the successful bipartisan framework that created the
free and open Internet and, for almost twenty years, saw it flourish. By proposing to end the
utility-style regulatory approach that gives government control of the Internet, we aim to restore

the market-based policies necessary to preserve the future of Internet Freedom, and to reverse
the decline in infrastructure investment, innovation, and options for consumers put into motion

by the FCC in 2015.").
Id. at 4435, 4441 ("Today, we propose to reinstate the information service
4.
classification of broadband Internet access service and return to the light-touch regulatory
framework first established on a bipartisan basis during the Clinton Administration. We also
propose to reinstate the determination that mobile broadband Internet access service is not a

commercial mobile service."); see Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 201-21, 48 Stat. 1064,
1070-81 (1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-31 (2012)).
See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *1-2. Chairman Ajit Pai
5.
supports broad, sweeping deregulation on grounds that the current regulatory regime "has
failed" and has generated the following adverse outcomes: "Investment in broadband networks

declined. Plans to deploy new and upgraded broadband infrastructure were shelved. Thousands
of good-paying jobs were lost due to lower infrastructure investment. Americans' online privacy

was weakened because Title II completely stripped the FTC of its authority over broadband
providers' privacy and data security practices." OFFICE OF THE CHARMAIN, FCC, RESTORING
https://apps.fc.gov/edocs-public/
(2017),
AMERICANS
FOR
ALL
FREEDOM
INTERNET

attachmatchlDOC-344592A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/JU8S-YAXQ].
Chairman Pai is now setting the FCC on a course to fix the problems that the prior
FCC created. His plan to restore Internet Freedom by repealing Obama-era Internet
regulations will benefit all Americans. Here's how: It will spur broadbanddeployment
throughout the country and thus bring better,

faster Internet

service to more
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In application, the FCC's new deregulatory initiative provides
far greater flexibility in how an Internet service provider (ISP) can
configure its networks, treat traffic handed off to it, and price services.
The FCC accords ISPs substantially more latitude to differentiate
service through largely unfettered discrimination in quality of
carriage, service, and price. 6 The recently repealed regulatory regime
supported some flexibility in terms of service tiering based on bit
transmission speed and monthly allotment of data that a subscriber
can upload and download.7 However, it imposed explicit prohibitions
on specific types of conduct deemed always harmful, such as
deliberately blocking and delaying traffic delivery, and also applied a
standard of care that foreclosed any behavior that unreasonably
interfered with or disadvantaged the ability of consumers to access
content and services. 8
Both the old and new regulatory regimes fail to create a
specific and unambiguous line separating lawful and unlawful price
and quality of service discrimination by ISPs that deliver Internet
Americans. It will create jobs by putting Americans to work deploying broadband
networks and by creating the networks and online opportunities necessary for
additional job growth and economic opportunity. It will boost competition and choice
in the broadband marketplace. It will secure online privacy by putting the FTC-the
nation's premier consumer protection agency-back in charge of broadband providers'
privacy practices. It will restore Internet Freedom by ending government
micromanagement and returning to the bipartisan regulatory framework that worked

well for decades.
Id. (emphasis in original).
6.
See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *2; Restoring Internet
Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4435. "[T]wo years ago, the FCC changed course. It decided to
apply utility-style regulation to the Internet. This decision represented a massive and
unprecedented shift in favor of government control of the Internet." Restoring Internet Freedom

NPRM, supra note 1, at 4435. The FCC's new ruling seeks to remove common carrier regulation
of broadband Internet access by reclassifying it as an information service. Id. at 4441.
The FCC cannot impose nondiscrimination requirements, price regulation, and other
common carrier rules on ISPs. See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628, 630, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
"We have little hesitation in concluding that the anti-discrimination obligation imposed on fixed
broadband providers has 'relegated [those providers], pro tanto, to common carrier status."' Id. at
655 (quoting FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 700-01 (1979)). "In requiring broadband
providers to serve all edge providers without 'unreasonable discrimination,' this rule by its very
terms compels those providers to hold themselves out 'to serve the public indiscriminately."' Id.
at 655-56 (first quoting Preserving the Open Internet: Broadband Industry Practices, 25 FCC
Red. 17905, 1706 (Dec. 23, 2010) [hereinafter 2010 Open Internet Order], vacated sub nom.
Verizon, 740 F.3d at 628; then quoting Nat'l Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d
630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976)).
7.
Protecting and Promoting the Open Internet, 30 FCC Red. 5601, 5652 (Mar. 12,
2015) [hereinafter 2015 Open Internet Order], aff'd sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass'n. v. FCC, 825
F.3d 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016), petition for en banc reh'g denied, 855 F.3d 381 (D.C. Cir. 2017),
abrogated, Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1.

8.

Id. at 5603.
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content to their retail broadband subscribers. No FCC Commissioner
wants to foreclose ISPs from offering different tiers of service based on
such factors as bit transmission speed and allowable volume of data
transmitted or received in a month. However, the Commissioners
have vigorously disagreed on whether the FCC needs to implement ex
ante regulatory safeguards to ensure that ISPs do not harm
consumers and competition with their strategies to differentiate
service.9

Legislatures and national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in the
United States and other nations have imposed "network neutrality"
rules for a variety of reasons. 10 Network neutrality obligations require
ISPs to operate as nondiscriminatory conduits-meaning that they
cannot block lawful content or deliberately drop packets of
traffic-both of which would degrade or ruin consumers' quality of
experience, particularly when downloading video content for
immediate viewing. 11 Some NRAs also prohibit ISPs from slowing the

Compare Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4492 (statement of
9.
Chairman Pai) ("The Internet wasn't broken in 2015. We were not living in a digital dystopia.
Nonetheless, the FCC that year succumbed to pressure from the White House and changed
course. Even though the FCC couldn't find any evidence of market failure, it turned its back on
almost two decades of success. It imposed upon all Internet service providers (ISPs), big and
small, the heavy-handed regulatory framework designed during the Roosevelt Administration to
micromanage the AT&T telephone monopoly. These utility-style regulations, known as 'Title II,'
were and are like the proverbial sledgehammer being wielded against the flea-except that here,
there was no flea."), with id. at 4507 (dissenting statement of Commissioner Clyburn) ("While
the majority engages in flowery rhetoric about light-touch regulation, and so on, the endgame
appears to be no-touch regulation and a wholescale destruction of the FCC's public interest
authority in the 21st century: Undermining the ability of poor people to get broadband,
knee-capping funding for rural telecommunications, declining to review an $85 billion
transaction with massive public interest implications, encouraging consolidation and higher
prices in business broadband, enabling massive broadcasting conglomerates to gobble up more
local voices. Each action is a cut against the public interest, and the majority will keep it coming,
unless Americans stand up, make their voices heard and challenge the FCC in court, because it
is glaringly obvious, with each open meeting, that the willingness and the ability of the majority
to protect consumers and competition in a broadband era, has come to a screeching halt.").
See, e.g., JAMES ALLEN ET AL., ANALYSYS MASON, STUDY ON NET-NEUTRALITY
10.
REGULATION (2017), http://berec.europa.euleng/document-register/subject-matter/berec/others/
7243-study-on-net-neutrality-regulation [https://perma.cclKZL5-KFXZ]; J. Scott Marcus, New
Network Neutrality Rules in Europe: Comparisons to Those in the U.S., 14 COLO. TECH. L.J. 259,
260 (2016).
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5621. "Network neutrality" refers to
11.
regulatory initiatives requiring ISPs to operate as neutral, nondiscriminating conduits
prohibited from prioritizing, blocking, or slowing traffic absent compelling network management
justifications. See Justin S. Brown & Andrew W. Bagley, Neutrality 2.0: The Broadband
Transition to Transparency, 25 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 639, 644 (2015);
Adam Candeub & Daniel McCartney, Law and the Open Internet, 64 FED. COMM. L.J. 493,
495-96 (2012); Rob Frieden, What's New in the Network Neutrality Debate, 2015 MICH. ST. L.
REV. 739, 746 (2015); Tejas N. Narechania & Tim Wu, Sender Side TransmissionRules for the
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speed of their network traffic delivery ("throttling") 12 with an eye
toward creating artificial congestion that would be quickly remedied if
content providers and distributors agree to pay a surcharge.1 3
Additionally, some NRAs prohibit ISPs from offering to prioritize their
handling of traffic from specific sources if they receive additional
compensation.14
NRAs can more readily and lawfully impose nondiscrimination
requirements on ISPs if they classify these service providers as
common carriers prohibited from engaging in unreasonable
practices. 15 However, even under this classification, ISPs can lawfully

Internet, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 467, 470 (2014); Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and
Quality of Service: What a Nondiscrimination Rule Should Look Like, 67 STAN. L. REV. 1, 4
(2015); Philip J. Weiser, The Next Frontierfor Network Neutrality, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 273, 277
(2008); Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 141, 145 (2003); Christopher S. Yoo, Beyond Network Neutrality, 19 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 5 (2005); Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO.
L.J. 1847, 1850-51 (2006); Marvin Ammori, The Case for Net Neutrality, FOREIGN AFF.
July-Aug.
2014,
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2014-06- 16/case-netneutrality [https://perma.cc/Q6SC-9RP6].
12.
Glossary,
EUR.
COMMISSION,
https://ec.europa.euldigital-singlemarket/glossary#throttling [https://perma.cc/2SCK-BJ7C] (last visited Feb. 2, 2018) (defining
throttling as "a technique employed to manage traffic and minimize congestion, [which] may be
used to degrade (e.g. slow down) certain type of traffic and so affect the quality of content").
13.
See Parliament and Council Regulation (EU) 2015/2120, 2015 O.J. (L 310) 1,
http://eur-lex.europa.eullegal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32015R2120&from=EN
[https://perma.cc/QAB7-AKCX] ("Any traffic management practices which go beyond such
reasonable traffic management measures, by blocking, slowing down, altering, restricting,
interfering with, degrading or discriminating between specific content, applications or services,
or specific categories of content, applications or services, should be prohibited, subject to the
justified and defined exceptions laid down in this Regulation."); Open Internet, EUR.
COMMISSION, https://ec.europa.euldigital-single-market/en/policies/open-internet-net-neutrality
[https://perma.cc/C8W3-BZRB] (last updated Dec. 20, 2017) ("EU rules on net neutrality (open
internet) apply as of 30 April 2016, following the adoption of Regulation (EU) 2015/2120 on 25
November 2015. This regulation is a major achievement for the Digital Single Market. It creates
the individual and enforceable right for end-users to access and distribute internet content and
services of their choice. Common EU rules on net neutrality ensure that the same provisions

apply across Europe. The rules enshrine the principle of net neutrality into EU law: no blocking
or throttling or discrimination of online content, applications and services.").
14.
See,
e.g.,
Telecom
Regulatory
Policy,
SOR/2017-104
(Can.),
http://crtc.gc.ca/eng/archive/2017/2017-104.htm
[https://perma.cclNDJ8-JUHL]
(establishing
criteria for evaluating whether an ISP's specific differential pricing practice constitutes unlawful
discrimination); see also Shane Greenstein, Martin Peitz & Tommaso Valletti, Net Neutrality: A
Fast Lane to Understandingthe Tradeoffs, 30 J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 142 (2016) (discussing the
economic impact of charging different rates).
15.
47 U.S.C. § 202(a) (2012). For example, Section 202(a) of the Communications Act of
1934 prohibits telecommunications service common carriers from engaging in unreasonable
discrimination:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable

discrimination in charges, practices, classifications, regulations, facilities, or services
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offer service tiers with different terms,

conditions, and prices.

Similarly, NRAs permit carriers to manage their networks in ways
that might impact quality of service, including offering service tiers
with different bit transmission speeds and data usage allotments;
filtering content deemed harmful, such as spam; and temporarily
throttling traffic, either during congestion or when a subscriber
exceeds a monthly data usage threshold. 16
Despite conscientious efforts to differentiate lawful and
unlawful discrimination, NRAs-such as the FCC-have generated
much regulatory uncertainty. ISPs may lack a clear sense of the
marketing inducements and service differentiation they can offer
without violating rules such as the prohibitions of paid prioritization
and throttling of specific traffic streams. When the FCC removed
specific prohibitions1 7 and reclassified broadband access,1 8 it did not
provide specific guidance on how biased and discriminatory ISP
networks can operate without triggering general polices favoring
neutrality, competition, and consumer rights of access.19
Despite such uncertainty, ISPs increasingly seek to offer
diversified tiers of service with different price points and surcharge
Additionally, ISPs have negotiated with specific
possibilities. 2 0

for or in connection with like communication service, directly or indirectly, by any
means or device, or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference

or

advantage to any particular person, class of persons, or locality, or to subject any
particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or unreasonable prejudice
or disadvantage.

Id.
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5651-52, 5669-70, 5672; see also
16.
Robert Klein, Data Caps: CreatingArtificial Scarcity as a Way Around Network Neutrality, 31
SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 139, 142 (2015).
Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4460 ("In the Title II Order,
17.
despite virtually no quantifiable evidence of consumer harm, the Commission nevertheless
determined that it needed bright line rules banning three specific practices by providers of both
fixed and mobile broadband Internet access service: blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization.
The Commission also 'enhanced' the transparency rule by adopting additional disclosure
requirements. Today, we revisit these determinations and seek comment on whether we should
keep, modify, or eliminate the bright line and transparency rules." (footnotes omitted) (citing
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5644, 5672-77; and 47 U.S.C. §§ 201, 202, 208)).
Id. at 4458 ("Proposing to restore broadband Internet access service to its long18.
established classification as an information service reflects our commitment to a free and open
Internet.").
See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1.
19.
https://www.xfinity.com/
XFINITY,
Play,
Double
Xfinity
e.g.,
20.
See,
learn/xfinity-doubleplay-central?CMP=KNC-43700014274765154-GOOGLE-241818020561-ccomcast%2Oplans-e-GeneralBRExactCentral-GBB(last
[https://perma.cc/C69W-6Y7L]
&gclid=CPGGybjemNkCFYJOgQodtYkODw&gcsrc=ds
visited Feb. 9, 2018).
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content providers to offer superior interconnection opportunities that
can reduce the potential for transmission delays and congestion. 21
For example, Comcast, a major ISP in the United States, and
Netflix, a predominant supplier of video content, resolved an
interconnection and compensation dispute by agreeing to interconnect
directly at Comcast's primary national switching facilities-an
opportunity not offered to other carriers and available to Netflix only
upon payment of a surcharge. 22
This arrangement reduces the
number of carrier networks and routing facilities needed by Netflix to
reach subscribers because the Comcast network will handle much of
the traffic management. 23 It enhances quality of service by reducing
the likelihood of network congestion and degraded video content
delivery. 24
At the end-user level, ISPs now offer subscribers opportunities
to qualify for subsidies, discounts, and special treatment of their
traffic downloads. 25
"Zero rating" provides subscribers with
cost-saving opportunities where an ISP offers not to debit a
subscriber's monthly data allotment when she downloads content
originating from specific sources. 26
With a zero rating option,

&

21.
See, e.g., Steven Musil, Netflix Reaches Streaming Traffic Agreement with Comcast,
CNET (Feb. 23, 2014, 10:03 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/netflix-reaches-streaming-trafficagreement-with-comcast/ [https://perma.cc/9WMZ-RM4M]; Edward Wyatt & Noam Cohen,
Comcast and Netflix Reach Deal on Service, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb.
23,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/24/business/media/comcast-and-netflix-reach-a-streamingagreement.html [https://perma.cc/QA23-HXT8];
see also Drew FitzGerald & Shalini
Ramachandran, Netflix-Traffic Feud Leads to Video Slowdown, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2014, 9:35
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/netflixtraffic-feud-leads-to-video-slowdown-1392772268
[https://perma.ccIV7MR-75Y9].
22.
See, e.g., Musil, supra note 21; Wyatt & Cohen, supra note 21; FitzGerald
Ramachandran, supra note 21.

23.
Wyatt & Cohen, supra note 21 ("Netflix will now deliver its content directly to
Comcast rather than going through an intermediary. These types of deals, known as 'paid
peering,' are typically struck between companies that manage the plumbing of the Internet,
unseen by consumers.").

24.
See id.
25.
See, e.g., One Plan. All Unlimited., T-MOBILE, https://www.t-mobile.com/cell-phoneplans [https://perma.cc/6WHC-BSTZ] (last visited Jan. 14, 2018).
26.
RATING:

ERIK STALLMAN & R. STANLEY ADAMS, IV, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH., ZERO
FRAMEWORK
FOR
ASSESSING
BENEFITS
AND
HARMS
2
(2016),

A

https://cdt.org/files/2016/01/CDT-Zero-RatingBenefits-Harms5_1.pdf
ER72]

("[Zero ratings are] commercial

arrangements

[https://perma.cclBBG6-

and unilateral decisions by network

operators pursuant to which [specific] Internet Protocol (IP)-delivered traffic is exempted from
usage-based
EXPLORING

pricing."); see
ZERO-RATING

also CAROLINA ROSSINI & TAYLOR MOORE, PUB. KNOWLEDGE,
CHALLENGES:
VIEWS
FROM
FIVE
COUNTRIES
1
(2015),

https://www.publicknowledge.org/assets/uploads/blog/ZeroRatingCombinedCR.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KUZ9-7QKE]; Ellen P. Goodman, Zero-Rating Broadband Data: Equality and
Free Speech at the Network's Other Edge, 15 COLO. TECH. L.J. 63, 64 (2016); Christopher T.
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broadband subscribers can conserve their monthly data allowance and
avoid having to pay a surcharge for exceeding it.
Some ISPs have offered an alternative to zero rating in light of
the possibility that it would violate the old network neutrality rules.
Carriers offer "unlimited" data plans, but the fine print in the deal
includes traffic throttling once subscribers exceed a specified volume
of data within a month or when network congestion occurs. 27 Some
wireless broadband carriers also offer a service option that provides
unlimited data but reduces the screen resolution of all video unless
subscribers pay a monthly surcharge for the faster transmission and
higher data capacity needed to retain the high-definition video
image. 28
Opponents of zero rating and video content downgrading have
predicted significant distortions to the marketplace of ideas, harm to
the level of innovation, and the potential for less competition. 29 They
Marsden, Comparative Case Studies in Implementing Net Neutrality: A CriticalAnalysis of Zero
Rating, 13 SCRIPTED 1, 8 (2016), https://script-ed.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/marsden.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9YPD-NKL9]. The term "sponsored data" represents the same arrangement,
with emphasis on the subsidy mechanism used. See, e.g., STALLMAN & ADAMS, supra, at 5-6.

27.
One Plan. All Unlimited., supra note 25 ("On all T-Mobile plans, during congestion,
the small fraction of customers using >50GB/mo. may notice reduced speeds until next bill cycle
due to data prioritization. . . . [V]ideo typically streams at DVD quality (up to 1.5Mbps [Megabits
per second]). . . . Tethering at max 3G speeds.").
See Mark Rogowsky, With T-Mobile Mixing It Up Again, Here's What You Need to
28.
Know,

FORBES

(Jan.

7,

2017,

5:54

AM),

https://www.forbes.com/sites/markrogowsky/

2017/01/07/with-t-mobile-mixing-it-up-again-heres-what-you-need-to-know/#5eOe261f400a
[https://perma.cclJ4A9-PEJN] ("The data is really unlimited? Yes and no. On the surface, you can
use as much 4G LTE via your phone as you want. But there are at least three catches that act as
brakes on your data usage: (1) If you exceed 28GB of data usage, which T-Mobile says 3% of
users do, then you are subject to throttling-or slower data speeds-during peak periods when
demand on the network is high[.] (2) Video streams are capped at 480p resolution, unless you
buy one of the special upgrades T-Mobile offers, described below[.] (3) When you 'tether' your
laptop to a smartphone to give it broadband access, that usage will be capped at 3G speeds,
which these days are often too slow to get much real work done. There's a way around that too,
but it isn't free."); Nate Swanner, T-Mobile's New 'Unlimited' One Plan Is Complete Nonsense,
NEXT WEB (Aug. 18, 2016) https://thenextweb.com/opinion/2016/08/18/t-mobile-one-plancomplete-nonsense/ [https://perma.cclL5UTK-3UBD] ("And all that video you watch? It's limited to
480p resolution, now. If you want 720, 1080 or 4K video, it'll cost you another $25 per month.");
see also Unlimited Data, Talk & Text at 50% off Verizon and AT&T Rates., SPRINT,
http://www.sprintorders.com/new-deals/ [https://perma.cclWWA2-VXB2] (last visited Jan 14,
2018) ("Mobile optimized: video streams at up to 480p+ resolution, music at up to 500kbps,
streaming gaming at up to 2mbps. Data deprioritization applies during times of congestion.").
29.
See Letter from New America's Open Technology Institute et al. to Tom Wheeler,
Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, Zero-Rating Plans Are a Serious Threat to the Open
Internet (Mar. 28, 2016), https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/12903-zero-rating-plans-area-serious-threat-to-the-open-internet/FinalZeroRatingSignOnLetter.fa929bef59a5423089a496b4f909fb97.pdf [https://perma.cc/6D7A-CWZD]; Davey Alba,
Big AT&T Deal Proves It's Time to Stop 'Zero-Rating, WIRED (Nov. 3, 2016, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/1 1/att-time-warner-deal-shows-time-stop-zero-rating/
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worry that specialized content access and delivery arrangements will
bolster the market dominance of incumbent carriers and a small
number of content providers by creating irresistible incentives for
consumers to favor unmetered content and to rely on deep-pocketed
carriers able to offer the most generous discounts or bundles of
services that combine content and carriage. 30 Proponents emphasize
that zero rating can provide opportunities for consumers to access
subsidized content and for program vendors with insignificant market
share to stimulate consumer interest. 31
This Article assesses the potential for harm to broadband
consumers and competitors when ISPs serving retail broadband
subscribers can interfere with content that traverses their "last mile" 32
networks en route to consumers. Part II of the Article explains the
concept of network neutrality and examines how the FCC has
undertaken different regulatory approaches that either support ex
ante safeguards or rely on ex post procedures for assessing whether
anticompetitive harms have occurred. Part III considers whether zero
rating and differences in quality of service constitute unlawful
discrimination.
Part IV of the Article examines whether FCC
treatment of other services provides a regulatory model for broadband
Internet access. Part V then identifies some of the challenges NRAs
will confront when assessing quality of service differentiation by ISPs.
The Article concludes that even though ISPs have self-serving,
[https://perma.cc/W8N4-JLPR] ("The overarching problem here is that widespread zero-rating
harms innovation. It prevents newer and smaller players from challenging the established
companies, and that's particularly true when those established companies start consolidating
and getting even bigger.").
30.
See, e.g., Editorial Bd., Why Free Can Be a Problem on the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/15/opinion/sunday/why-free-can-be-a-problem-on-theinternet.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cclA8U2-KXC3]; Susan Crawford, Less than Zero, WIRED (Jan.
7,
2015,
12:00
AM),
https://www.wired.com/2015/01/less-than-zero/#.dbs7t699u
[https://perma.cclY64X-AL5B]; Emily Hong, A Zero Sum Game? What You Should Know About
Zero-Rating, NEW AM. (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/109/a-zero-sum-game-

what-you-should-know-about-zero-rating/ [https://perma.cc/BBA5-QYWL].
AND

31.
See, e.g., MULTICULTURAL MEDIA, TELECOM & INTERNET COUNCIL, UNDERSTANDING
APPRECIATING ZERO-RATING: THE USE AND IMPACT OF FREE DATA IN THE MOBILE

BROADBAND
SECTOR
9
(2016),
MMTCZeroRatingImpact-onConsumersMay2016.pdf
STEVEN TITCH, R STREET,

http://mmtconline.org/WhitePapers/
[https://perma.cc/EW26-V3LH];

ZERO RATING IN A COMPETITIVE BROADBAND MARKET 2 (2017),

http://2o9ubO4l7chl2lg6m43em6psi2i.wpengine.netdna-cdn.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/03/88.pdf [https://perma.cc/J86Z-L9QN].
32.
ISPs directly providing broadband access to consumers control the first link to the
Internet for uploading traffic as well as the last link for downloading content. This type of ISP is
commonly deemed the provider of first and last mile broadband access. See Emily Stewart, Net
Neutrality Isn't the Only Way to Keep the Internet Fair. It's Just the Only Way in America, VOX
(Dec. 14, 2017, 9:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/12/14/16692318/netneutrality-local-loop-broadband-internet-access [https://perma.cclWB9J-D4UH].
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profit-maximizing goals when enhancing or degrading content
carriage and display, such practices can have positive spillover effects
that enhance consumer welfare without significantly harming
competition in the marketplace of ideas and Internet commerce. In
addition, the Article recommends that NRAs offer a speedy and fair
complaint resolution process to remedy content carriage disputes,
particularly when regulators, such as the FCC, establish policies
based on the assumption that ISPs lack market power and have no
incentives to degrade quality of service or create artificial network
congestion.
II. REGULATORY INTERVENTION TO ENSURE A FAIR, NEUTRAL, AND
OPEN INTERNET

Advocates for network neutrality have emphasized the need for
NRAs to impose nondiscrimination requirements on ISPs to prevent
these carriers from meddling with traffic they deliver. 33 Proponents of
compulsory conduit neutrality have concerns that last mile ISPs will
demand additional compensation to prioritize specific traffic streams
or to refrain from delivering video content at reduced quality-for
example, by reducing the line resolution of video images from 1080
lines to as few as 480 lines-to conserve bandwidth and avoid network
congestion. 34
Rather than interconnect, switch, and route traffic on an
unbiased "best efforts" basis, ISPs appear to have the ability-and
possibly also the incentive-to block and drop content packets or to
intentionally slow traffic with the false claim of network congestion.35
33.
Net Neutrality: What You Need to Know Now, SAVE THE INTERNET,
[https://perma.cc/
https://www.savetheinternet.com/net-neutrality-what-you-need-know-now
FUR7-DC7N] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) ("When you go online you have certain expectations.
You expect to be connected to whatever website you want. You expect that your cable or phone
company isn't messing with the data and is connecting you to all websites, applications and
content you choose. You expect to be in control of your internet experience. When you use the
internet you expect Net Neutrality. Net Neutrality is the basic principle that prohibits internet
service providers like AT&T, Comcast and Verizon from speeding up, slowing down or blocking
any content, applications or websites you want to use. Net Neutrality is the way that the
internet has always worked.").
34.
See Jon Brodkin, Verizon to Start Throttling All Smartphone Videos to 4 80p or 720p,
https://arstechnica.comlinformationAM),
5:00
2017,
22,
(Aug.
TECHNICA
ARS
technology/20 1 7/08/verizon-to-start-throttling-all-smartphone-videos-to-480p-or-720p/
[https://perma.cc/N9LY-FX8V].
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5608 ("[B]roadband providers have both
35.
the incentive and the ability to act as gatekeepers standing between edge providers and
consumers. As gatekeepers, they can block access altogether; they can target competitors,
including competitors to their own video services; and they can extract unfair tolls. Such conduct
would, as the Commission concluded in 2010, 'reduce the rate of innovation at the edge and, in

666

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:3:655

Additionally, ISPs could demand surcharge payments to prioritize
traffic and provide "better than best efforts" traffic delivery when real
congestion occurs or when the carrier creates artificial congestion as
negotiation leverage for receiving higher compensation from content
creators and distributors.3 6
Senior ISP managers claim they would never resort to such
tactics. 37
However, the FCC previously sanctioned Comcast for
deliberately blocking video traffic that provided an alternative to the
company's offerings. 38
Comcast made matters worse through its
repeated claims of innocence and its claims that any blockage
constituted necessary network management, despite clear evidence
that no actual congestion had occurred. 39 The FCC determined that
Comcast blocked one specific type of traffic without technical
justification. 40
The blocked traffic stream offered Comcast's
turn, the likely rate of improvements to network infrastructure.' In other words, when a
broadband provider acts as a gatekeeper, it actually chokes consumer demand for the very
broadband product it can supply." (quoting 2010 Open Internet Order, supranote 6, at 17911)).
36.
See id. at 5632, 5667; see also id. at 5914 (statement of Chairman Wheeler) ("We
know from the history of previous networks that both human nature and economic opportunism

act to encourage network owners to become gatekeepers that prioritize their interests above the
interests of their users. As the D.C. Circuit observed in the Verizon decision and as the public
record affirms, broadband providers have both the economic incentive and the technological
capability to abuse their gatekeeper position.").
37.
Joe Waz, 10 Facts About Peering, Comcast and Level 3, COMCAST (Nov. 30, 2010),
http://corporate.comcast.comcomcast-voices/10-facts-about-peering-comcast-and-level-3

[https://perma.cc[BH24-4GYH] ("1. Our customers get access to all the online video they want,
along with any other Internet content, application, or service they choose-regardless of its
source. 2. Any rumors about blocking Netflix are false.").
38.
Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corp. for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, 23 FCC Red. 13028, 13028, 13037 (Aug. 20, 2008)
[hereinafter Comcast Traffic Throttling Investigation], vacated sub nom. Comcast Corp. v. FCC,
600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
39.
Id. at 13030-32 ("Comcast subscribers began to notice that they had problems using
BitTorrent and similar technologies over their Comcast broadband connections. Last year, their
complaints began to receive widespread attention in the press. When first confronted with these
press reports, Comcast-the nation's second largest provider of broadband Internet access

services-misleadingly disclaimed any responsibility for the customers' problems. . . . Comcast
claimed that it sent RST packet [a reset packet] 'only during periods of peak network congestion'
and 'only . . . during periods of heavy network traffic.' Evidence in the record, however,
contradicts this claim." (footnotes omitted)).
40.
Id. at 13050-51, 13058 ("The record leaves no doubt that Comcast's network
management practices discriminate among applications and protocols rather than treating all
equally. To reiterate: Comcast has deployed equipment across its networks that monitors its
customers' TCP [Transmission Control Protocol] connections using deep packet inspection to
determine how many connections are peer-to-peer uploads. When Comcast judges that there are
too many peer-to-peer uploads in a given area, Comcast's equipment terminates some of those
connections by sending RST packets [reset packets]. In other words, Comcast determines how it
will route some connections based not on their destinations but on their contents; in laymen's
terms, Comcast opens its customers' mail because it wants to deliver mail not based on the
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broadband subscribers alternatives to the pay-per-view video options
available from the company. 41
A. The FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order
The FCC previously expressed concern that without muscular,
common carrier regulatory oversight, ISPs would create fast lanes
offering "better than best efforts" traffic prioritization at a surcharge
while relegating everyone else to intentionally slow lanes possibly
unable to handle even ordinary traffic volumes. 42 The potential

.

address or type of stamp on the envelope but on the type of letter contained therein. . .
Comcast's practices contravene industry standards and have significantly impeded Internet
users' ability to use applications and access content of their choice. Moreover, the practices
employed by Comcast are ill-tailored to the company's professed goal of combating network
congestion. In sum, the record evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Comcast's conduct
poses a substantial threat to both the open character and efficient operation of the Internet, and
is not reasonable." (footnotes omitted)).
Id. at 13028, 13037, 13058 ("We consider whether Comcast, a provider of broadband
41.
Internet access over cable lines, may selectively target and interfere with connections of peer-topeer (P2P) applications [like BitTorrent] under the facts of this case. Although Comcast asserts
that its conduct is necessary to ease network congestion, we conclude that the company's
discriminatory and arbitrary practice unduly squelches the dynamic benefits of an open and
accessible

Internet

and does not constitute

reasonable

network

management.

Moreover,

Comcast's failure to disclose the company's practice to its customers has compounded the
harm. . . . [I]t is our expert judgment that Comcast's practices do not constitute reasonable
network management, a judgment that is generally confirmed by experts in the field. Comcast's
practices contravene industry standards and have significantly impeded Internet users' ability to
use applications and access content of their choice. Moreover, the practices employed by Comcast

are ill-tailored to the company's professed goal of combating network congestion. In sum, the
record evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Comcast's conduct poses a substantial threat
to both the open character and efficient operation of the Internet, and is not reasonable."
(footnotes omitted)).
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5608 ("The record demonstrates the need
42.
for strong action. The Verizon court itself noted that broadband networks have 'powerful
incentives to accept fees from edge providers, either in return for excluding their competitors or
for granting them prioritized access to end users.' Mozilla, among many such commenters,

explained that '[p]rioritization . . . inherently creates fast and slow lanes.' Although there are
arguments that some forms of paid prioritization could be beneficial, the practical difficulty is
this: the threat of harm is overwhelming, case-by-case enforcement can be cumbersome for
individual consumers or edge providers, and there is no practical means to measure the extent to

which edge innovation and investment would be chilled. And, given the dangers, there is no room
for a blanket exception for instances where consumer permission is buried in a service plan-the
threats of consumer deception and confusion are simply too great." (footnotes omitted) (quoting
Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 645-46 (D.C. Cir. 2014))); id. at 5690 ("Some edge and transit
providers assert that large broadband Internet access service providers are creating artificial
congestion by refusing to upgrade interconnection capacity at their network entrance points for
settlement-free peers or CDNs [Content Delivery Networks], thus forcing edge providers and
CDNs to agree to paid peering arrangements. These parties suggest that paid arrangements
resulting from artificially congested interconnection ports at the broadband Internet access
service provider network edge could create the same consumer harms as paid arrangements in
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marketplace distortion lies in the expectation that ISPs can exploit
market power, particularly for the last mile delivery of content to
retail broadband subscribers. 43 Content providers and distributors
unable or unwilling to pay surcharges would experience artificial
congestion and quality of service degradation, which in turn would
deteriorate consumers' quality of experience. Bear in mind that for
video content, consumers appear to have very low tolerance for any
form of network performance declines that prevent the seamless
display of "must see," "mission critical" content. 44
NRAs, such as the FCC in 2015, have anticipated the likelihood
that ISPs will pursue price and quality of service discrimination
strategies that could harm competition and consumers rather than
provide different service tiers and price points. The FCC currently
does not consider ex ante safeguards necessary to prevent or sanction
anticipated market distortions. Instead, the Commission relies on
general requirements of transparency, such as disclosure of network
management practices, coupled with ex post remedies if and when
such abuses occur.4 5 Ex ante and ex post remedies have costs,

the last-mile, and lead to paid prioritization, fast lanes, degradation of consumer connections,
and ultimately, stifling of innovation by edge providers." (footnotes omitted)); DEREK TURNER,
FREE
PRESS,
NET
NEUTRALITY:
INVESTMENT
AND
ECONOMICS
http://www.freepress.net/sites/default/files/fp-legacy/Net Neutrality

2-4

(2010),

InvestmentandEconomics.pdf [https://perma.cc/398U-UVSA] ("Without Network Neutrality,
ISPs will have a strong incentive to reduce investment and make congestion commonplace in
order to extract revenues from content providers willing to pay to avoid traffic delays. Without
open Internet rules, ISPs will be granted license to abuse their positions as terminating access
monopolies, which is in direct conflict with the Act's goals for nondiscriminatory
interconnection."). Network neutrality advocates worry that ISPs will intentionally degrade basic
broadband service with an eye toward forcing upstream content providers to pay additional fees
to ensure that content arrives without disruption, even though no such surcharge was necessary

previously. See, e.g., TURNER, supra, at 9.
43.
See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 645-46 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("Broadband providers
also have powerful incentives to accept fees from edge providers, either in return for excluding
their competitors or for granting them prioritized access to end users."); 2015 Open Internet

Order, supra note 7, at 5608, 5693-94.
44.
See, e.g., John D. Sutter, Online Viewers Ditch Slow-Loading Video After 2 Seconds,
CNN (Nov. 12, 2012, 11:52 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2012/11/12/tech/web/video-loadingstudy/index.html [https://perma.ccfP3Q5-XFSB]; see also Roger Dooley, Don't Let a Slow Website
Kill
Your
Bottom
Line,
FORBES
(Dec.
4,
2012,
8:40
AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/rogerdooley/2012/12/04/fast-sites/#7ea6ld4c53cf
("[V]isitors leave
sites in much higher numbers when pages take longer to load."); Steve Lohr, For Impatient Web
Users, an Eye Blink Is Just Too Long to Wait, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 29, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/01/technology/impatient-web-users-flee-slow-loading-sites.html
("People will visit a Web site less often if it is slower than a close competitor by more than 250
milliseconds (a millisecond is a thousandth of a second).")
45.
See Rob Frieden, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches to Network Neutrality: A
Comparative Assessment, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1561, 1608 (2015); Jasper P. Sluijs, Network
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particularly when they fail to detect and remedy a marketplace
distortion-a false negative-and when they identify and sanction
reasonable price and quality of service discrimination-a false
positive. 46
Rigid ex ante safeguards make it difficult for NRAs to assess
whether an access pricing arrangement harms content competition
and consumers or provides customized solutions at a premium price to
defray the higher costs incurred in upgrading networks so they can
The FCC
handle growing consumer demand for video content.
previously prohibited ISPs from blocking traffic, throttling delivery
47
An
speeds, and demanding surcharges for prioritizing traffic.
forms
absolute ban on such practices ignores the possibility that some
of preferred status provide lawful and desirable enhancements,
particularly when real network congestion increases the odds for
consumer
in
resulting
performance,
network
degraded
48
dissatisfaction.
A near absolute or complete prohibition on traffic prioritization
precludes last mile ISPs from offering enhanced routing of certain
traffic streams prone to congestion, such as video streaming of a movie
Similarly, the prohibition may prevent
or a live sporting event.
specific content providers and distributors from securing optimized
traffic interconnection opportunities like that achieved by Netflix with
Comcast, as the parties settled a compensation and traffic exchange
49
dispute that already had triggered consumer irritation.
Ex ante safeguards prevent or substantially burden the
offering of reasonable, premium service options that enhance the
quality of experience for broadband consumers and offer a higher
quality of service to content providers. Ex ante regulation, moreover,
can impose unneeded prohibition of desirable, specialized service
arrangements, but ex post remedies may arrive too late-well after
the harm-so that monetary damages or other sanctions prove
inadequate.5 0

Neutrality Between False Positives and False Negatives: Introducing a European Approach to
American BroadbandMarkets, 62 FED. COMM. L.J. 77, 88 (2010).
See Frieden, supranote 45, at 1608.
46.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5603.
47.
See, e.g., id. at 5601. The Communications Act deems unjust and unreasonable
48.
practices to be unlawful: "All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in
connection with such communication service, shall be just and reasonable, and any such charge,

practice, classification, or regulation that is unjust or unreasonable is declared to be unlawful."
47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (2012).
See Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 655-56 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
49.
See Frieden, supra note 45, at 1594.
50.
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In 2008, 2010, and 2015, the FCC opted to apply ex ante
regulatory oversight when addressing whether and how to guard
against tactics of broadband Internet access providers that harm
competition and consumers. 51 In 2015, the FCC imposed its most
muscular safeguards yet by reclassifying broadband Internet access as
a telecommunications service, thereby securing jurisdiction to apply ex
ante common carrier requirements. 52 In 2016, an appellate court
approved the FCC's reclassification of broadband access, opting not to
second-guess the Commission's new rationales for expanding its
regulatory reach. 53
Reclassification offered the FCC the opportunity to establish
clear jurisdiction for applying common carrier regulatory oversight of
ISPs. However, it also generated vigorous opposition to the FCC's
initiative even though the Commission volunteered to forbear from
applying many regulations absent compelling circumstances. 54
A
Republican majority at the FCC recently eliminated network
neutrality regulation.5 5

51.
See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17906; 2015 Open Internet Order,
supra note 7, at 5607; Comcast Traffic Throttling Investigation, supra note 38, at 13028, 13034;
see also Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (deeming the FCC to have exceeded
its statutory authority when responding to a complaint and imposing network neutrality rules).

52.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5614-15 ("[T]his Order concludes that
the retail broadband Internet access service available today is best viewed as separately
identifiable offers of (1) a broadband Internet access service that is a [common carrier]
telecommunications service (including assorted functions and capabilities used for the
management and control of that telecommunication service) and (2) various 'add-on' applications,
content, and services that generally are information services.").
53.
U.S. Telecom Ass'n. v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689, 707 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
54.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5603 ("[W]e concurrently exercise the
Commission's forbearance authority to forbear from application of 27 provisions of Title II of the
Communications Act, and over 700 Commission rules and regulations. This is a Title II tailored
for the 21st century, and consistent with the 'light-touch' regulatory framework that has
facilitated the tremendous investment and innovation on the Internet.").
55.
See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *1-2; Jim Puzzanghera,
FCC Votes to Repeal Net Neutrality Rules, A Milestone for Republican Deregulation Push, L.A.
TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-net-neutrality-fcc-20171214story.html [https://perma.cc/7DDX-BE56]; see also Ajit Pai, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n,
Remarks Before the Free State Foundation's Tenth Anniversary Gala Luncheon (Dec. 7, 2016),
https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatchlDOC-342497A.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
Z9B8-MU4Y] ("[Plroof of market failure should guide the next Commission's consideration of new
regulations. And the FCC should only adopt a regulation if it determines that its benefits
outweigh its costs. The Title II Order [the 2015 Open Internet Order], of course, failed to respect
these principles. There was no evidence of systemic failure in the Internet marketplace. . . . On
the day that the Title II Order was adopted, I said that 'I don't know whether this plan win be
vacated by a court, reversed by Congress, or overturned by a future Commission. But I do believe
that its days are numbered.' Today, I am more confident than ever that this prediction will come
true.").
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The FCC previously emphasized the need for narrowly crafted
rules designed to "prevent specific practices we know are harmful to
Internet openness-blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization-as
well as a strong standard of conduct designed to prevent the
deployment of new practices that would harm Internet openness."5 6
The Commission emphasized that ISPs have both the incentive and
the ability to leverage access in ways that can thwart the virtuous
cycle of innovation and investment in the Internet ecosystem:
The key insight of the virtuous cycle is that broadband providers have both the
incentive and the ability to act as gatekeepers standing between edge providers
and consumers. As gatekeepers, they can block access altogether; they can target
competitors, including competitors to their own video services; and they can extract
57
unfair tolls.

The FCC considered it essential that ISPs not have the ability
to exploit Internet access in anticompetitive ways that would reduce
demand for Internet-based services. 8 To achieve that goal, the
Commission established a clear ISP nondiscrimination rule in its 2015
Open Internet Order:
Any person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar
as such person is so engaged, shall not unreasonably interfere with or
unreasonably disadvantage (i) end users' ability to select, access, and use
broadband Internet access service or the lawful Internet content, applications,
services, or devices of their choice, or (ii) edge providers' ability to make lawful
content, applications, services, or devices available to end users. Reasonable
59
network management shall not be considered a violation of this rule.

2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5603.
56.
Id. at 5604, 5608.
57.
Id. at 5604, 5629, 5632 ("Broadband providers' networks serve as platforms for
58.
Internet ecosystem participants to communicate, enabling broadband providers to impose
barriers to end-user access to the Internet on one hand, and to edge provider access to broadband
subscribers on the other.... Mhe record provides substantial evidence that broadband providers
have significant bargaining power in negotiations with edge providers and intermediaries that
depend on access to their networks because of their ability to control the flow of traffic into and
on their networks. Another way to describe this significant bargaining power is in terms of a
broadband provider's position as gatekeeper-that is, regardless of the competition in the local
market for broadband Internet access, once a consumer chooses a broadband provider, that
provider has a monopoly on access to the subscriber. . . . Broadband providers can exploit this
role by acting in ways that may harm the open Internet, such as preferring their own or
affiliated content, demanding fees from edge providers, or placing technical barriers to reaching
end users. Without multiple, substitutable paths to the consumer, and the ability to select the
most cost-effective route, edge providers will be subject to the broadband provider's gatekeeper
position." (footnotes omitted)).
Id. at 5609 (emphasis omitted). The FCC defines a reasonable network management
59.
practice as one having "a primarily technical network management justification, but does not
include other business practices. A network management practice is reasonable if it is primarily
used for and tailored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into
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This
"no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage"
rule
established an expectation that ISPs operate as neutral conduits for
content without favoring or disfavoring specific content streams. 60 On
one hand, nondiscrimination rules prevent ISPs from providing
preferential and superior handling of traffic generated by a corporate
affiliate or a third party willing to pay a surcharge. 6 1 But on the other
hand, the rules largely prevented ISPs from providing upstream
content providers with opportunities to secure expedited treatment of
traffic that may need comparatively better processing to ensure
superior quality of service. While the rules created the risk of
sanctions for generating artificial congestion to extort higher
payments from content providers, they also could have sanctioned
benign or desired enhancements when actual congestion could
otherwise result in degraded service.
The prohibition on prioritizing traffic generated uncertainty
about what ISPs can and cannot do to tier and differentiate service. 62
For example, the FCC expressed concerns about zero rating of the
wireless traffic generated by a corporate affiliate and content
providers willing to pay a surcharge. 63 While these arrangements

account the particular network architecture and technology of the broadband Internet access
service." Id. at 5611 (emphasis omitted).
60.
See id. at 5608.
61.
Id. at 5607-08. The 2015 Open Internet Order prohibits paid prioritization of traffic
that would offer "better than best efforts" carriage for additional compensation. Id.
Paid prioritization occurs when a broadband provider accepts payment (monetary or
otherwise) to manage its network in a way that benefits particular content,

applications, services, or devices. To protect against "fast lanes," this Order adopts a
rule that establishes that: A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet
access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not engage in paid
prioritization. "Paid prioritization" refers to the management of a broadband
provider's network to directly or indirectly favor some traffic over other traffic,
including through use of techniques such as traffic shaping, prioritization, resource
reservation, or other forms of preferential traffic management, either (a) in exchange
for consideration (monetary or otherwise) from a third party, or (b) to benefit an
affiliated entity.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
62.
See id. at 5608 ("Although there are arguments that some forms of paid
prioritization could be beneficial, the practical difficulty is this: the threat of harm is
overwhelming, case-by-case enforcement can be cumbersome for individual consumers or edge

providers, and there is no practical means to measure the extent to which edge innovation and
investment would be chilled. And, given the dangers, there is no room for a blanket exception for
instances where consumer permission is buried in a service plan-the threats of consumer

deception and confusion are simply too great." (footnotes omitted))
63.
WIRELESS TELECOMMS. BUREAU, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, POLICY REVIEW OF
MOBILE BROADBAND OPERATORS' SPONSORED DATA OFFERINGS FOR ZERO-RATED CONTENT AND

SERVICES 17 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/DailyReleases/Daily Business/2017/db011/DOC342987A1.pdf [https://perma.cc/36KB-RBTB] [hereinafter 2017 WIRELESS TELECOMM. BUREAU
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could reduce consumers' out-of-pocket costs, they could also distort the
competitive marketplace for different types of content by making zero
simply because
rated content comparatively more attractive
downloading it does not debit a monthly data cap.
In addition to the specific prohibitions on blocking, throttling,
and paid prioritization, the FCC established a general prohibition on
ISP practices that would unreasonably interfere with or disadvantage
downstream consumers and upstream edge providers of content,
applications, and services. 64 The Commission created a process for
considering on a case-by-case basis whether an ISP engaged in a
practice "that unreasonably interfere[s] with or unreasonably
disadvantage[s] the ability of consumers to reach the Internet content,
services, and applications of their choosing or of edge providers to
access consumers using the Internet." 65
The Commission applied a more open-ended evaluation than
the legal standard it previously proposed in its 2014 Open Internet
unreasonable
commercially
prohibited
which
rule,
proposed
practices. 66 The FCC concluded that it should "adopt a governing
standard that looks to whether consumers or edge providers face
unreasonable interference or unreasonable disadvantages, and makes
clear that the standard is not limited to whether a practice is
agreeable to commercial parties."6 7

ZERO RATING REPORT]

("Mobile broadband providers are experimenting with a variety of

sponsored data and zero-rating initiatives. While this dynamic environment has benefited
consumers, these business arrangements may raise many of the same economic and public policy

issues involving network owners that the Commission has long considered. In particular,
sponsored data offerings by vertically integrated mobile broadband providers may harm
consumers and competition in downstream industry sectors by unreasonably discriminating in

favor of select downstream providers, especially their own affiliates.").
64.
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5607, 5659.
Id. at 5659.
65.
Id. at 5659, 5665 ("Based on the record before us, we are persuaded that adopting a
66.
legal standard prohibiting commercially unreasonable practices is not the most effective or
appropriate approach for protecting and promoting an open Internet."); see also Protecting and

Promoting the Open Internet, 29 FCC Rcd. 5561, 5602 (May 15, 2014).
Id. at 5666. The FCC identified a number of factors it will consider in future
67.
evaluations. These include an assessment of whether a practice allows end-user control and is
consistent with promoting consumer choice; its competitive effect; whether consumers and
opportunities for free expression are promoted or harmed; the effect on innovation, investment,

or broadband deployment; whether the practice hinders the ability of end users or edge providers
to use broadband access to communicate with each other; and whether the practice conforms to
best practices and technical standards adopted by open, broadly representative, and independent
Internet engineering, governance initiatives, or standards-setting organizations. Id. at 5661-65.
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The
FCC
in
2015
created
a
"no-unreasonable
interference/disadvantage" 68 standard to evaluate controversial
subjects, including the lawfulness of sponsored data arrangements
where an ISP accepts advertiser payment in exchange for an
agreement not to meter and debit the downstream traffic delivery. 69
The Commission also established an enhanced transparency
requirement building on language contained in its 2010 Open Internet
Order that required specific disclosures regarding network practices,
performance characteristics, and commercial terms. 70
The Commission also used these standards to consider the
lawfulness of data caps that tier service by the amount of permissible
downloading volume." The FCC saw the potential for an ISP to
create artificial scarcity in order to extract higher revenues by
68.
Id. at 5609 ("Thus, the Order adopts the following standard: Any person engaged in
the provision of broadband Internet access service, insofar as such person is so engaged, shall not
unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage (i) end users' ability to select, access,
and use broadband Internet access service or the lawful Internet content, applications, services,
or devices of their choice, or (ii) edge providers' ability to make lawful content, applications,
services, or devices available to end users." (emphasis omitted)).
69.
Id. at 5666-68 ("While our bright-line rule to treat paid prioritization arrangements
as unlawful addresses technical prioritization, the record reflects mixed views about other
practices, including usage allowances and sponsored data plans. Sponsored data plans
(sometimes called zero-rating) enable broadband providers to exclude edge provider content from
end users' usage allowances. On the one hand, evidence in the record suggests that these
business models may in some instances provide benefits to consumers, with particular reference
to their use in the provision of mobile services. Service providers contend that these business
models increase choice and lower costs for consumers. . . . On the other hand, some commenters
strongly oppose sponsored data plans, arguing that 'the power to exempt selective services from
data caps seriously distorts competition, favors companies with the deepest pockets, and
prevents consumers from exercising control over what they are able to access on the Internet,'
again with specific reference to mobile services. . . . [W]e will look at and assess such practices
under the no-unreasonable interference/disadvantage standard, based on the facts of each
individual case, and take action as necessary.").
70.
47 C.F.R. § 8.3 (2018) ("A person engaged in the provision of broadband Internet
access service shall publicly disclose accurate information regarding the network management
practices, performance, and commercial terms of its broadband Internet access services sufficient
for consumers to make informed choices regarding use of such services and for content,
application, service, and device providers to develop, market, and maintain Internet offerings.");
see also 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17936. While vacating both the antidiscrimination and the anti-blocking rules, the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit upheld
the FCC's statutory authority to impose transparency requirements. Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d
623, 659 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
71.
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5609 ("[Tlhe [2015 Open Internet]
Order builds on the strong foundation established in 2010 and enhances the transparency rule
for both end users and edge providers, including by adopting a requirement that broadband
providers always must disclose promotional rates, all fees and/or surcharges, and all data caps or
data allowances; adding packet loss as a measure of network performance that must be
disclosed; and requiring specific notification to consumers that a 'network practice' is likely to
significantly affect their use of the service.").
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favoring corporate affiliates and third parties willing to pay a
surcharge. 72 Additionally, the Commission worried that data caps
have the potential for disadvantaging competitors by creating
disincentives for consumers to try new video programming options,
However, the
particularly if a zero rated ISP option exists.7 3
Commission also recognized that service tiering can promote
innovation and new customized services.7 4

B. The DC CircuitAffirms the FCC
On appeal to the US Court of Appeals for the DC Circuit, the
FCC in United States Telecom Ass'n defended its legal right to
reclassify services in light of changed circumstances. The Commission
had to convince the court that the Communications Act authorizes
service reclassifications or lacks specificity, thereby allowing an expert
a
2-1
In
ambiguities.7 5
clarify
to
agency
regulatory
and
acceptance
legal
philosophies
different
vastly
decision-reflecting

See id. at 5632 ("Similarly, broadband providers have incentives to charge for
72.
prioritized access to end users or degrade the level of service provided to non-prioritized content.
When bandwidth is limited during peak hours, its scarcity can cause reliability and quality
concerns, which increases broadband providers' ability to charge for prioritization.").
See id. at 5632 ("Broadband providers may seek to gain economic advantages by
73.
favoring their own or affiliated content over other third-party sources. Technological advances
have given broadband providers the ability to block content in real time, which allows them to
act on their financial incentives to do so in order to cut costs or prefer certain types of content.
Data caps or allowances, which limit the amount and type of content users access online, can
have a role in providing consumers options and differentiating services in the marketplace, but
they also can negatively influence customer behavior and the development of new applications."
(footnotes omitted)).
74.
Id.
See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 689, 696-97, 701 (D.C. Cir 2016)
75.
("[W]e think it important to emphasize two fundamental principles governing our responsibility
as a reviewing court. First, our 'role in reviewing agency regulations . . . is a limited one.' Our job
is to ensure that an agency has acted 'within the limits of [Congress's] delegation' of authority,
and that its action is not 'arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law.' Critically, we do not 'inquire as to whether the agency's decision is wise as
a policy matter; indeed, we are forbidden from substituting our judgment for that of the agency.'
Nor do we inquire whether 'some or many economists would disapprove of the [agency's]
approach' because 'we do not sit as a panel of referees on a professional economics journal, but as
a panel of generalist judges obliged to defer to a reasonable judgment by an agency acting
pursuant to congressionally delegated authority."' (first quoting Ass'n of Am. R.R.s v. Interstate
Commerce Comm'n, 978 F.2d 737, 740 (D.C. Cir. 1992); then citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984); then quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012); then
quoting Assn ofAm. R.R.s, 978 F.2d at 740; and then quoting City of Los Angeles v. U.S. Dep't of
Transp., 165 F.3d 972, 978 (D.C. Cir. 1999))); see also Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X
Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005); Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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of the FCC's rationales, assumptions, and evidence-the court rejected
all challenges to the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order.76
The majority considered its review function quite limited. The
court opted to apply ample case precedent supporting deference to
regulatory agency expertise on both procedural and substantive
areas.7 7 In a nutshell, the majority opted not to second guess the FCC
and expressed support for the Commission's interpretation of law and
for its assessment of how consumers access the Internet and what
they expect from service providers.7 8
Despite contentions that
relevant statutes were enacted to reduce government oversight, the
court affirmed the FCC's expansion of its regulatory wingspan. 79
The court accepted the FCC's rationale for reclassification,
considering it reasonable in light of how consumers rely on
telecommunications links to access content largely offered by ventures
other than the carrier providing access. 8 0 Additionally, the majority
opinion considered and rejected many of the objections raised in the
partial dissent of Judge Williams. In particular, the majority rejected
Judge Williams's reliance on assertions that reclassification would

76.
concurring
77.
78.

See U.S. Telecom Ass'n, 825 F.3d at 702, 744; see also id. at 744 (Williams, J.,
in part and dissenting in part).
See id. at 696-97 (majority opinion).
See id. The court supported the FCC's determination that broadband internet access

constitutes a separate and standalone service vis-a-vis the information services that consumers
acquire via telecommunications service links. "That consumers focus on transmission to the

exclusion of add-on applications is hardly controversial. Even the most limited examination of
contemporary broadband usage reveals that consumers rely on the service primarily to access
third-party content." Id. at 698. The court also noted that broadband internet access providers
use information services to facilitate links to content, but it agreed with the FCC that such
reliance does not convert the telecommunications service into an information service. Id. at 699.
79.
Id. at 734 ("That brings us to our colleague's suggestion that the Order embodies a
'central paradox[ ]' in that the Commission relied on the Telecommunications Act to 'increase
regulation' even though the Act was 'intended to "reduce regulation."' We are unmoved. The Act,
by its terms, aimed to 'encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.'
If, as we reiterate here (and as the partial dissent agrees), section 706 grants the Commission
rulemaking authority, it is unsurprising that the grant of rulemaking authority might occasion
the promulgation of additional regulation. And if, as is true here (and was true in Verizon), the
new regulation is geared to promoting the effective deployment of new telecommunications
technologies such as broadband, the regulation is entirely consistent with the Act's objectives."
(citations omitted) (first quoting id. at 770 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); then quoting Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat 56 (1996))).
80.
Id at 698, 713 ("The problem in Verizon was not that the Commission had
misclassified the service between carriers and edge providers but that the Commission had failed
to classify broadband service as a Title II service at all. The Commission overcame this problem
in the Order by reclassifying broadband service-and the interconnection arrangements
necessary to provide it-as a telecommunications service.").
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harm carriers' incentives to invest in infrastructure. 81 The court held
that "it was not unreasonable for the Commission to conclude that
broadband's particular classification was less important to investors
than increased demand."8 2 Judge Williams, by contrast, endorsed
various filings that found flaws in the FCC's economic and market
analysis. 83 The majority refrained from rejecting the FCC's overall
assessments and replacing them with general criticisms on the
sufficiency of the FCC's analysis.8 4
The court also found no defects in the FCC's decision to apply
its Open Internet access rules to mobile broadband access.8 5 The court
rejected the rationale that those rules could only apply to fixed
services because the traditional understanding of common carrierdelivered public switched telephone network services only applies to
publicly available fixed, wireline service. 86 The court considered
mobile broadband as now generally available to the public, as
evidenced by the widespread use of smartphones that provide both
voice and data services. 8 7
The court strongly rejected the argument that the FCC's Open
Internet rules impermissibly constrain the First Amendment freedom
to
been
subject
have
long
carriers
"Common
of ISPs:
nondiscrimination and equal access obligations akin to those imposed
by the rules without raising any First Amendment question. Those

81.
See id. at 710; see also id. at 754-55 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) ("I do not understand the Commission to claim that its new rules will have a direct
positive effect on investment in broadband. The positive effect is expected from the way in which,
in the Commission's eyes, the new rules encourage demand for and supply of content, which it
believes will indirectly spur demand for and investment in broadband access. The direct effect, of
which the Commission doesn't really speak, seems unequivocally negative . . . . Besides imposing
the usual costs of regulatory compliance, the Order increases uncertainty in policy, which both
reason and the most recent rigorous econometric evidence suggest reduce investment." (emphasis
in original)).
Id. at 710 (majority opinion).
82.
83.
Id. at 746-48 (Williams, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 710 (majority opinion).
84.
Id. at 714 ("We reject mobile petitioners' arguments and find that the Commission's
85.
reclassification of mobile broadband as a commercial mobile service is reasonable and supported
by the record.").

86.
Id. at 716 ("We find the Commission's reclassification of mobile broadband as a
commercial mobile service under that definition to be reasonable and supported by record
evidence demonstrating the 'rapidly growing and virtually universal use of mobile broadband
service' today. In support of its reclassification decision, the Commission relied on, and recounted
in detail, evidence of the explosive growth of mobile broadband service and its near universal use
by the public. In the face of that evidence, we see no basis for concluding that the Commission
was required in 2015 to continue classifying mobile broadband as a 'private' mobile service."
(citations omitted) (quoting 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5786)).
87.
See id. at 715-17.
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obligations affect a common carrier's neutral transmission of others'
speech, not a carrier's communication of its own message."88 The court
noted that "telephone companies, railroads, and postal services" have
borne equal access obligations like those now applied to ISPs "without
raising any First Amendment issue." 8 9
C. The 2017 Network Neutrality Reversal ProposedRule
After the election of President Donald Trump and the
appointment of Ajit Pai as FCC Chairman, the Commission repealed
its muscular network neutrality rules. 90 Despite judicial affirmance of
an earlier reclassification of broadband Internet access as a
telecommunications service subject to common carrier regulation, the
FCC reclassified broadband Internet access service as a Title I
information service and mobile broadband Internet access service as
private carriage. 9 1 In its notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), the
Commission heavily relied on a controversial conclusion that common
carrier regulation stifles investment, innovation, and employment in
the Internet ecosystem. 92 While offering a dismissive reference to
contrary studies, 93 the FCC opted to accept unconditionally the
conclusion in three studies favorable to incumbent carriers that

88.
Id. at 740 (emphasis in original).
89.
Id. The court noted that in some instances, ISPs do create and distribute content,
but in such instances common carriage requirements do not apply.
If a broadband provider nonetheless were to choose to exercise editorial
discretion-for instance, by picking a limited set of websites to carry and offering that
service as a curated internet experience-it might then qualify as a First Amendment

speaker. But the Order itself excludes such providers from the rules.
Id. at 743 (emphasis in original).
90.
See Cecilia Kang, F.C.C. Repeals Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/14/technology/net-neutrality-repeal-vote.html

[https://perma.cc/6Q5Q-QKT9]; see also Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *1-2.
91.

See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *1-2.

92.

See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4435-36; see also Restoring

Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *1-2.

93.

See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4449 & n.116; see also S.

DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, IT'S WORKING: HOW THE INTERNET ACCESS AND ONLINE VIDEO
MARKETS ARE THRIVING IN THE TITLE II ERA 114 (2017), https://www.freepress.net/sites/default/

files/resources/internet-access-and-online-video-markets-are-thriving-in-title-II-era.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3TZT-JXDL]; Karl Bode, One More Time with Feeling: Net Neutrality Didn't
Hurt Broadband Investment in the Slightest, TECHDIRT: NET NEUTRALITY (Aug. 24, 2016, 6:29

AM), https://www.techdirt.com/blog/netneutrality/articles/20160823/09034535313/one-more-time[https://perma.cc/
with-feeling-net-neutrality-didnt-hurt-broadband-investment-slightest.shtml
8ENG-Y7YY]; Sara Kamal, The Truth About Net Neutrality and Infrastructure Investment, PUB.

KNOWLEDGE: BLOGS (May 8, 2017), https://www.publicknowledge.org/news-blog/blogs/the-truthabout-net-neutrality-and-infrastructure-investment [https://perma.cc/4WJV-CR8T].
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existing regulation imposed substantial marketplace harms. 9 4
By
doing so, the Commission ignored clear evidence that Internet
ventures continue to invest billions in both content-delivery network
infrastructure and the acquisition of content-creation firms that need
a robust distribution network to deliver content to consumers. 95
Remarkably, the Commission appeared to conclude that any
and all reductions in investment, innovation, and employment have
resulted directly and exclusively from common carrier responsibilities
It
imposed by the FCC when a Democratic majority existed.9 6
provided no evidence of causation, nor did it even consider other
contributing factors, such as the billions of dollars recently invested in
content-for example, Verizon's acquisition of America Online 97 and
Yahoo, 98 AT&T's acquisition of DirecTV, 99 and several mergers of cable
television operators.10 0 Additionally, the Commission conveniently
ignored the cyclical nature of facilities investment, which, for example,
spikes
with
the
installation
of
a
new
generation
of
infrastructure-from third-generation to fourth-generation wireless
94.
See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4449 & nn.113-15.
95.
See Thomas Gryta, AT&T Closes $49 Billion DirecTV Buy, WALL ST. J. (July 24,
2015,
3:42
PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/at-t-closes-49-billion-directv-acquisition1437766932?mg-prodlaccounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/C6TK-HBVD]; Kamal, supra note 93; Trefis
Team, AT&T's Time Warner Deal Looking Likely, Will It Be a Catalyst for the Stock?, FORBES
(Aug. 9, 2017, 1:55 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2017/08/09/atts-timewarner-deal-looking-likely-will-it-be-a-catalyst-for-the-stock/#5dd78e3al83b
[https://perma.cc/WB6L-VSWN]; see also Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at
4449 ("We believe that these reduced expenditures are a direct and unavoidable result of Title II
reclassification, and exercise our predictive judgment that reversing the Title II classification
and restoring broadband Internet access service to a Title I service will increase investment.").
96.
See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4449.
97.
See Kevin Fitchard, The Real Reason Verizon Bought AOL, FORTUNE (June 24,
2015), http://fortune.com/2015/06/24/verizon-gains-aoll [https://perma.cclYGL4-Q2NT] ("Verizon
recently completed its $4.4 billion acquisition of Internet pioneer AOL. . . . The telecom giant is
one of the most successful companies in the world (it currently sits at number 15 on the Fortune

500) .... However, growth in the mobile market is likely to slow in the coming years, with any
significant revenue generated by luring consumers away from competing mobile operators or

selling current customers more than one device. The days of huge quarterly subscriber
connections are over, which means the company needs to find a new cash cow if it intends to
keep growing.").
98.
See Vindu Goel, Verizon Completes $4.48 Billion Purchase of Yahoo, Ending an Era,
N.Y. TIMEs (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/technology/yahoo-verizonmarissa-mayer.html? r=O [https://perma.cclYME6-3T49].
99.
See Gryta, supranote 95. AT&T also has sought regulatory approval to acquire Time
Warner for approximately $85 billion. See Trefis Team, supranote 95.
100.
See, e.g., Cynthia Littleton, What's Next Now That Charter-Time Warner Cable
Merger Is Complete, VARIETY (May 18, 2016, 6:25 AM), http://variety.com/2016/tv/news/chartertime-warner-cable-merger-completed-1201777511/
[https://perma.cc/ZNH7-2QA5]
(discussing
Charter Communications' acquisition of Time Warner Cable and Bright House Networks in 2016
at a cost of $67.1 billion).
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plant, for instance-then experiences a normal reduction in capital
expenditures as the new equipment becomes operational. The FCC
also ignored the fact that, despite operating under a purportedly
onerous common carrier regulatory regime, wireless carriers have
invested billions in spectrum and network facilities capable of
delivering content at near wireline speeds.1 01
The Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM devoted substantial
space to supporting the proposed reclassification of broadband
Internet access as an information service. The Commission considered
this classification consistent with marketplace conditions and case
precedent, and representative of what a bipartisan FCC adopted
before 2015 when the previous Democratic majority of Commissioners
voted in favor of common carrier requirements:
We believe the Commission under Democratic and Republican leadership alike was
correct in these decisions to classify broadband Internet access service as an
information service and that, 20 years after the passage of the Telecommunications
Act, we should be reluctant to second-guess the interpretations of those more likely
to understand the contemporary meaning of the terms of the Telecommunications
Act. 102

The Commission identified ample precedent where reviewing
courts defer to its technical expertise and statutory interpretation,
particularly where the underlying law lacks clarity.1 03
Ironically, reversion to the information services classification
may result in two outcomes that can have a directly harmful impact
on consumers and carriers. First, reliance on the general authority to

101.
See Fitchard, supra note 97. The FCC implies that regulatory compliance forces
carriers to incur costs that otherwise would have accrued consumer benefits. See Restoring
Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4449 ("Internet service providers have finite
resources, and requiring providers to divert some of those resources to newly imposed regulatory
requirements adopted under Title II will, unsurprisingly, reduce expenditures that benefit
consumers.").
102.
Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4447.
103.
See id. at 4452-53.
An agency also is free to change its approach to interpreting and implementing a
statute so long as it acknowledges that it is doing so and justifies the new approach.
Evaluating the change in regulatory approach in the Title II Order, the D.C. Circuit
majority in USTelecom [sic] applied a "highly deferential standard" to the agency's
predictive judgments regarding the investment effects of reclassification, and deferred
to the Commission's "evaluat[ion of] complex market conditions"[] underlying its
rejection of providers' reliance interests in the prior classification.
Id. (footnotes omitted) (first citing FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515-16
(2009); then citing Mary V. Harris Found. v. FCC, 776 F.3d 21, 24-25 (D.C. Cir. 2015); and then
citing U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 825 F.3d 674, 707, 710 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). "The Commission has
authority, as the Supreme Court recognized in Brand X, to interpret the Communications Act,
including ambiguous definitional provisions." Id. at 4452 (citing Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n
v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980-81 (2005)).
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regulate wire and radio services under Title I of the Communications
Act1 0 4 does not in and of itself reduce the regulatory uncertainty that
the FCC and stakeholders abhor105 because of the potential
disincentives for investment, innovation, and employment it might
create. The FCC signaled that its reliance on Title I will promote
deregulation, if not unregulation, but ample case precedent shows that
reviewing courts may not trust regulatory agencies to maintain
consistency. 106 The FCC clearly seeks to remove regulatory oversight,
but it also retains so-called "ancillary jurisdiction" under Title I, which

104.
See Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, §§ 1-5, 48 Stat. 1064, 1064-70 (1934)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-55 (2012)). Section 1 of the Communications Act
authorizes the FCC to
regulat[e] interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio so as
to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, without
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid,
efficient, Nation-wide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges, for the purpose of the national defense, for
the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and radio
communications.
47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012). The FCC uses this broad mandate as the basis for "ancillary jurisdiction"
when no explicit statutory authorization exists but the Commission believes it must act to serve
the public interest with oversight and the imposition of safeguards that do not require explicit
statutory authority. See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976, 989 (deferring to the FCC's expertise in
determining the nature and scope of regulatory safeguards required by new broadband Internet
access technologies); see also United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 659, 662 (1972)
(determining that the FCC can impose mandatory broadcast channel carriage by cable television
operators despite a lack of specific statutory authority); United States v. Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S.
157, 172-73, 177 (1968) (explaining how the FCC can safeguard regulated broadcasters from
economic harm caused by emerging cable television services); John Blevins, Jurisdiction as
Competition Promotion:A Unified Theory of the FCC's Ancillary Jurisdiction,36 FLA. ST. U. L.
REV. 585, 586-87 (2009).
See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4451. The Commission
105.
considers Title II regulation to cause substantial regulatory uncertainty despite the greater
specificity this Title provides as compared to Title I. See id. ("In addition to imposing significant
regulatory costs on Internet service providers, Title II reclassification created significant
regulatory uncertainty. US Telecom [sic] specifically identified 'regulatory uncertainty' as one of
the causes of reduced investment."). Title I provides an ambiguous sphere of regulatory
authority, which the FCC overstepped when it imposed common carrier responsibilities on
broadband service providers then classified as information service providers. See 2010 Open
Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17935, 17981. Compare Comcast Traffic Throttling
Investigation, supra note 38, at 13035 (asserting the FCC's ability to exercise Title I ancillary
jurisdiction), with Comcast Corp. v. FCC, 600 F.3d 642, 644 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (illustrating that the
FCC was deemed to have exceeded its statutory authority when responding to a complaint and
imposing network neutrality rules).
106.
See, e.g., Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2014). For example, a
reviewing court twice prohibited a Democratic-majority FCC from imposing consumer safeguards
based on a general conferral of jurisdiction over wire and radio contained in Title I. See id.;
Comcast Corp., 600 F.3d at 643.
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courts have interpreted to permit limited additional regulatory
intervention.10 7

Second, reversion to Title I oversight reinforces the
questionable view that the FCC can compartmentalize Internet
technologies
into
a
mutually
exclusive
dichotomy
of
telecommunications services and information services,1 08 despite
market and technological convergence. For example, the FCC has
already had to address the fact that wireless devices combine basic,
regulated telecommunications services, such as voice telephony and
texting, with unregulated or differently regulated content and
information services. 109 Even during a time when the Commission
considered broadband access as constituting an information service, it
imposed common carrier-type affirmative duties to deal and
interconnect on wireless carriers so that consumers could access
Internet services when "roaming" outside their home service
territories.11 0
107.
See Brand X, 545 U.S. at 976 ("Information-service providers, by contrast, are not
subject to mandatory common-carrier regulation under Title II, though the Commission has
jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to
regulate interstate and foreign communications." (citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-61)); see also Sw.
Cable, 392 U.S. at 172 (arguing that the FCC can regulate aspects of cable television service in
light of its potential economic harm to directly regulated broadcast television).
108.
See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4447 ("The Commission has
previously
concluded
that
Congress
formally
codified
information
services
and
telecommunications services as two, mutually exclusive types of service in the
Telecommunications Act. The Title II Order did not appear to disagree with this analysis, finding
that broadband Internet access service was a telecommunications service and not an information
service. We believe this conclusion regarding mutual exclusivity is correct based on the text and
history of the Act." (footnotes omitted)). The FCC stated: "We also believe that mobile broadband
Internet access service is not the 'functional equivalent' of commercial mobile service." Id. at
4455 (citing 47 U.S.C. § 332(d)(3)).
109.
See, e.g., Reexamination of Roaming Obligations of Commercial Mobile Radio Service
Providers and Other Providers of Mobile Data Services, 26 FCC Rcd. 5411, 5411-12 (Apr. 7,
2011) (arguing that the FCC had lawful authority to impose a duty to deal obligations between
wireless carriers when subscribers seek data service while "roaming" outside local service areas).
110.
See Cellco P'ship v. FCC, 700 F.3d 534, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
The Federal Communications Commission has long imposed "roaming" requirements
on wireless telephone companies. Roaming occurs when wireless subscribers travel
outside the range of their own carrier's network and use another carrier's network
infrastructure to make a call. Until the issuance of the rule challenged in this case,
mobile carriers' obligation to permit roaming extended only to voice-telephone
services. Recognizing the growing importance of mobile data in a wireless market in
which smartphones-cellphones that can connect to the internet-are increasingly
common, the Commission adopted a rule requiring mobile-data providers to offer
roaming agreements to other such providers on "commercially reasonable" terms. . ..
[Allthough the rule bears some marks of common carriage, we defer to the
Commission's determination that the rule imposes no common carrier obligations on
mobile-internet providers.
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The FCC also eliminated the application of a catchall standard
used in the 2015 Open Internet Order that prohibited "current or
future practices that cause the type of harms [the Commission's] rules
are intended to address."1 11 "This standard allows the Commission to
prohibit practices that it determines unreasonably interfere with or
unreasonably disadvantage the ability of consumers to reach the
Internet content, services, and applications of their choosing or of
online content, applications, and service providers to access
consumers." 112 It also enables the FCC "to prohibit any Internet
service provider practice that it believes violates any one of the
nonexhaustive list of factors adopted in the" 2015 Open Internet
Order. 113
The Commission believed that eliminating a standard of
conduct would provide greater clarity to stakeholders because the
current rules are "premised on theoretical problems that will be
adjudicated on an individual, case-by-case basis, [so that] Internet
service providers must guess at what they are permitted and not
permitted to do." 1 14 The Commission cited zero rating as an example
where the FCC, under a Democratic majority, investigated the
lawfulness of subsidized data access, while the new Republican
Arguably, the
majority quickly shut down the investigation.1 1 5
regulatory uncertainty resulted from different interpretations of the
conduct standard based on political party affiliation rather than the
conduct standard itself. Removing the standard provides no guidance
at all, unless the Commission has signaled that it cannot anticipate a
problem with any carrier offer to exempt specific types of traffic from
debiting a monthly data allowance.
The 2017 Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM also sought
comments on whether the FCC should eliminate the three key carrier

Id.
See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *186; see also 2015 Open
111.
Internet Order, supranote 7, at 5659.
112.
Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supranote 1, at *88 n.883.
113.
Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4458.
114.
Id. at 4459.
115.
See id.
The now-retracted so-called Zero Rating Report issued by the Wireless
Telecommunications Bureau illustrates the dilemma providers experience under a
Title II regulatory regime. After a thirteen-month investigation, the Report did not
specifically call for an end to any provider's practices or identify any particular harm
from offering consumers free data. Instead, it stated that the free-data plans "may
raise" economic and public policy issues that "may harm consumers and competition."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting 2017 WIRELESs TELECOMM. BUREAU ZERO RATING REPORT, supra
note 63, at 17).
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conduct prohibitions contained in the 2015 Open Internet Order:
blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization. 116 The Commission
strongly hinted that it considers these ex ante safeguards both
unnecessary and imposed without evidence that consumers have or
would suffer harm if the prohibitions did not exist. 117
The Commission also sought comments on whether Section 706
of the Telecommunications Act"1 8 provides it with direct statutory
authority to impose regulatory safeguards or simply requires the FCC
to assess the competitiveness and accessibility of the broadband
marketplace and report findings to Congress. 119 This portion of the
proposed rule may appear insignificant and narrow, but a majority of
Commissioners now believe that Section 706 provides no statutory
authority to impose regulatory safeguards under any circumstances. 1 2 0
Even if the current FCC Commissioners nominally retained the option
of regulatory intervention, an already expressed view that the wired
and wireless broadband marketplace operates competitively strongly
implies that a majority-Republican FCC would never seek to impose
regulatory safeguards based on Section 706 authority.
For good measure, the Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM also
sought comments regarding whether any regulatory burden on
broadband access providers would violate their First Amendment
expression rights-a matter summarily dismissed by the DC Circuit

116.
See id. at 4460 ("In the Title II Order, despite virtually no quantifiable evidence of
consumer harm, the Commission nevertheless determined that it needed bright line rules
banning three specific practices by providers of both fixed and mobile broadband Internet access
service: blocking, throttling, and paid prioritization. The Commission also 'enhanced' the
transparency rule by adopting additional disclosure requirements. Today, we revisit these
determinations and seek comment on whether we should keep, modify, or eliminate the bright

line and transparency rules." (footnotes omitted) (citing 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7,
at 5644, 5672-77)).
117.
See id.
118.
See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153
(1996) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (2012)).
119.
See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4466-67 ("Although some
courts have held that the Commission's post-2010 interpretation of section 706(a) and/or (b) as a
grant of regulatory authority was not unreasonable, we seek comment on whether interpreting
those provisions as hortatory nonetheless is the better reading. Or should we maintain our
post-2010 interpretation of these provisions? Alternatively, we seek comment whether section
706 reflects a 'deregulatory bent,' and, if so, how we should interpret that with respect to
obligations for regulated entities." (footnotes omitted)).
120.
See id. at 4466 ("We seek comment on whether section 706(a) and (b) of the 1996 Act
are best interpreted as hortatory rather than as delegations of regulatory authority. Such an
interpretation generally is reflected in the Commission's approach to section 706 prior to 2010.
The text of these provisions also appears more naturally read as hortatory, particularly given the
lack of any express grant of rulemaking authority, authority to prescribe or proscribe the conduct
of any party, or to enforce compliance." (footnotes omitted)).
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majority in United States Telecom Ass'n but raised in the partial
dissent. 121 Finally, the FCC expressed a keen interest in applying a
disciplined and substantive cost-benefit analysis assessing the
financial impacts of its action. 122 Although a laudable goal, the FCC's
ultimate ruling failed to achieve this goal, instead reaching broad
sweeping conclusions without generating the empirical evidence and
analysis it now regularly seeks to perform.
D. The Restoring Internet Freedom Order
Earlier this year-on a 3-2 party-line vote-the FCC again
shifted its Internet regulatory posture, this time eliminating all rules
and regulations that anticipate and remedy practices that harm
consumers and competition. 123 The Republican majority voted a
complete reversal of what it considered heavy-handed and
unnecessary marketplace meddling that the Democratic majority had
created in 2015.124 The current FCC deemed its reversal as necessary
to remedy the marketplace intrusions of the 2015 Open Internet Order
that the majority alleges to have harmed competition, broadband
infrastructure investment, and innovation. 12 5
The Restoring Internet Freedom document has three parts: a
Declaratory Ruling, Report and Order, and Order (for convenience,
this Article refers to this document as the "Restoring Internet
In the Declaratory Ruling portion, the FCC
Freedom Order").
reclassifies broadband Internet access service as an "information

121.
122.

See id. at 4467-68.
Id. at 4468-70.

123.

See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *1-2.

See id. at *1 ("We reverse the Commission's abrupt shift two years ago to
124.
heavy-handed utility-style regulation of broadband Internet access service and return to the
light-touch framework under which a free and open Internet underwent rapid and
unprecedented growth for almost two decades. We eliminate burdensome regulation that stifles
innovation and deters investment, and empower Americans to choose the broadband Internet

access service that best fits their needs.").
Id. at *35 ("The Commission has long recognized that regulatory burdens and
125.
uncertainty, such as those inherent in Title II, can deter investment by regulated entities . ...
The balance of the evidence in the record suggests that Title II classification has reduced ISP
investment in broadband networks, as well as hampered innovation, because of regulatory
uncertainty."). Ironically, when asserting that wireless broadband constitutes a full, competitive
alternative to wireline option, the Restoring Internet Freedom Order emphasizes the near-term
availability of fifth-generation wireless service that required substantial sunk investment by
carriers subject to network neutrality obligations: "With the advent of 5G technologies promising
sharply increased mobile speeds in the near future, the pressure mobile exerts in the broadband
market place will become even more significant." Id. at *49.
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service" not lawfully subject to Title II common carrier regulation. 1 2 6
Before its 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC treated broadband
access as an information service and the Supreme Court deferred to
the Commission's regulatory judgment in the Brand X case. 12 7 After
Brand X, however, the FCC attempted to use its "ancillary
jurisdiction" under Title I of the Communications Act to justify
regulatory
safeguards
twice
considered
as
unlawful
common carrier-type duties by reviewing courts. 128
The Restoring Internet Freedom Order reclassifies wireless
broadband Internet access service as a private mobile service1 29 in an
attempt to remove the common carrier responsibilities created by
Congress for the Commercial Mobile Radio Service provided by
cellular telephone companies. 130 The Order also removes the FCC's
authority to use its telecommunications-specific expertise to guard
against possible antitrust, consumer protection,
and privacy
violations. Instead, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will assume
this responsibility1 31 for broadband ventures not classified as common
carriers. 132

126.
[W]e end utility-style regulation of the Internet in favor of the market-based
policies necessary to preserve the future of Internet freedom. In the 2015 Title II Order,
the Commission abandoned almost twenty years of precedent and reclassified
broadband Internet access service as a telecommunications service subject to myriad
regulatory obligations under Title II of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended
(the Act). We reverse this misguided and legally flawed approach and restore
broadband Internet access service to its Title I information service classification. We
find that reclassification as an information service best comports with the text and
structure of the Act, Commission precedent, and our policy objectives. We thus return
to the approach to broadband Internet access service affirmed as reasonable by the

U.S. Supreme Court.
Id. at *2 (footnotes omitted).
127.
Nat'l Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 996-97
(2005).
128.
See 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17981; Comcast Traffic Throttling
Investigation, supranote 38, at 13036.
129.
See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *2 ("We also reinstate the
private mobile service classification of mobile broadband Internet access service and return to
the Commission's definition of 'interconnected service' that existed prior to 2015. We determine
that this light-touch information service framework will promote investment and innovation
better than applying costly and restrictive laws of a bygone era to broadband Internet access
service.").
130.
See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 6002, 107
Stat. 312, 393 (1993) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 332 (2012)); 47 C.F.R. § 20.3 (2018).
131.
"Our balanced approach also restores the authority of the nation's most experienced
cop on the privacy beat-the Federal Trade Commission-to police the privacy practices of
[ISPs]." Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *2.
132.
In FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 835 F.3d 993, 997-98 (9th Cir. 2016), aff'd en banc,
883 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2018), the Ninth Circuit initially ruled that the FTC lacked jurisdiction
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The Report and Order portion creates a transparency
requirement for broadband carriers to disclose information about their
practices to consumers, entrepreneurs, and the Commission, including
any blocking,
throttling,
paid prioritization,
or affiliated
prioritization. 133 The FCC considers disclosure sufficient instead of an
absolute prohibition of the practices mentioned above.
The
Commission also considers the "bright line" rules created in the 2015
Open Internet Order as too expensive and constraining. 134
Additionally, the Commission has eliminated the Internet conduct
standard based on the view that it is vague and could provide the
basis for FCC micromanagement of innovative ISP business models
and their commercial relationship both downstream to retail
broadband consumers and upstream to other ISPs, content
distribution networks (CDNs) such as Akamai, 135 and content
creators.136

over any venture that provided both services lawfully within its jurisdiction and those outside its
jurisdiction,

such

as

common

carrier

telecommunications

services.

An

en

banc

panel

subsequently rejected the prior emphasis on common carrier status and determined that the
FTC has jurisdiction based on an assessment of carrier activities. FTC v. AT&T Mobility LLC,
883 F.3d 848, 863-64 (9th Cir. 2018). The en banc panel did not accept the rationale that once an
ISP secures the status as a common carrier for some offered services, that status provides a

complete exemption for any and all services available from an ISP. See id. at 859-60.
Accordingly, the FTC will have jurisdiction over the information services of ventures that also
provide common carrier telecommunication services.
133.
See Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supra note 1, at *2 ("Next, we require ISPs to
be transparent. Disclosure of network management practices, performance,

and commercial

terms of service is important for Internet freedom because it helps consumers choose what works
best for them and enables entrepreneurs and other small businesses to get technical information
needed to innovate. Individual consumers, not the government, decide what Internet access
service best meets their individualized needs. We return to the transparency rule the
Commission adopted in 2010 with certain limited modifications to promote additional
transparency, and we eliminate certain reporting requirements adopted in the Title II Order that
we find to be unnecessary and unduly burdensome." (footnote omitted)).
134.
See Ferras Vinh, Rules of the Road: Net Neutrality's Bright Line Protections, CTR.
FOR DEMOCRACY & TECH. (May 11, 2017), https://cdt.org/blog/rules-of-the-road-net-neutralitysbright-line-protections/ [https://perma.cc/F4DL-9FFB].
135.
Content distribution networks provide high-capacity broadband transmission
capabilities for delivery of content to ISPs located in geographically dispersed locations. They
guarantee higher quality of service by distributing content to many storage facilities located
throughout locations where content consumers reside. See, e.g., About Akamai, AKAMAI,
https://www.akamai.com/us/en/about/ [https://perma.cclYMW3-7PKV] (last visited Feb. 15, 2018).
136.
We eliminate the conduct rules adopted in the Title II Order-including the
general conduct rule and the prohibitions on paid prioritization, blocking, and
throttling. We do so for three reasons. First, the transparency rule we adopt, in
combination with the state of broadband Internet access service competition and the
antitrust and consumer protection laws, obviates the need for conduct rules by
achieving comparable benefits at lower cost. Second, scrutinizing closely each prior
conduct rule, we find that the costs of each rule outweigh its benefits. Third, the record
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The Order portion unilaterally shuts down any additional
fact-finding and public comment-filing opportunities, concluding that
the public interest would not be served by adding to the
already-voluminous record in this proceeding.1 3 7
III. Do ZERO RATING AND QUALITY OF SERVICE ENHANCEMENTS OR
REDUCTIONS CONSTITUTE UNLAWFUL DISCRIMINATION?
Zero rating eliminates out-of-pocket costs borne by retail
broadband subscribers, while often also downgrading high-definition
video traffic to standard definition. 3 8 This combination of generosity
and thrift makes it possible for ISPs to replace metered broadband
service with more plentiful use options that are close to, but not
actually, unlimited in nature. Both types of enhancements offer new
and existing broadband subscribers marketing inducements rather
than targeting specific sources of traffic for favorable or unfavorable
treatment.
Arguably, the FCC's previous concern with paid prioritization
concentrated on instances where ISPs could divide their networks into
premium lanes-capable of providing reliable video delivery-and
normal lanes, which previously achieved the same result but now
would not. Zero rating does not provide better guarantees of traffic
delivery and quality of service. Instead, the ISPs create an attractive
financial inducement for broadband subscribers to favor content
originating from specific sources that have, sponsored the zero rating
and to migrate to more expensive service tiers offering unlimited data
or to a higher monthly data allowance.
Deliberately downgrading video resolution comes closer to
violating the paid prioritization prohibition as well as a 2005 Policy
Statement1 39 endorsed in the Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM and
the subsequent Order. 140 With bilateral support, the FCC identified
does not identify any legal authority to adopt conduct rules for all ISPs, and we decline
to distort the market with a patchwork of non-uniform, limited-purpose rules.
Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supranote 1, at *86; see id. at *88-89.
137.
See, e.g., id. at *119 ("We are convinced that we have a full and complete record on
which to base our determination today without incorporating . .. [additional] materials[.]").
138.

STALLMAN & ADAMS, supra note 26, at 2; One Plan. All Unlimited., supra note 25.

139.
See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, 20 FCC Red. 14986, 14988 (Sept. 23, 2005) [hereinafter 2005 Policy Statement].
140.
See Restoring Internet Freedom NPRM, supra note 1, at 4439; see also id. at 4458
("[Wie explore the best method to restore the long-standing consensus under both Democratic
and Republican-led Commissions, represented by the four Internet Freedoms, that consumers
should have access to the content, applications, and devices of their choosing as well as
meaningful information about their service, all without deterring the investment and innovation
that has allowed the Internet to flourish. We examine these freedoms and the Commission's
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four consumer "Internet Freedoms" that it expected ISPs to honor,
albeit without the threat of regulatory sanction and enforcementl 41 :
[T]o ensure that broadband networks are widely deployed, open, affordable, and
accessible to all consumers, the Commission adopt[ed] the following principles:
[1] To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to access the
lawful Internet content of their choice.
[2] To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to run
applications and use services of their choice, subject to the needs of law
enforcement.
[3] To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to connect their
choice of legal devices that do not harm the network.
[4] To encourage broadband deployment and preserve -and promote the open and
interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to competition
among network providers, application and service providers, and content
providers.142

Even though ISPs appear disinclined to discriminate between
sources of high-definition video content, they want to degrade quality
of service for all video traffic absent additional payment. ISPs offer to
restore the high-definition video feed from all sources but only if retail
broadband subscribers agree to pay more. 143 ISPs generally combine

current rules related to them, and for each, ask whether we should keep, modify, or eliminate
them.").
For decades, the lodestar of the Commission's approach to preserving Internet
freedom was a light-touch, market-based approach. . . . It continued during the Bush
Administration, as reflected in the "Four Freedoms" articulated by Chairman Powell
in 2004 and was then formally adopted by a unanimous Commission in 2005 as well
as in a series of classification decisions reviewed above. And it continued for the first
six years of the Obama Administration. We reaffirm and honor this longstanding,
bipartisan commitment by adopting a light-touch framework that will preserve
Internet freedom for all Americans.
Restoring Internet Freedom Order, supranote 1, at *74 (footnote omitted).
See 2005 Policy Statement, supra note 139, at 14988.
141.
142.
Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). "[T]he Commission has jurisdiction
necessary to ensure that providers of telecommunications for Internet access or Internet
Protocol-enabled (IP-enabled) services are operated in a neutral manner." Id. at 14987-88.
143.
See Jon Fingas, Verizon's New Unlimited Plans Throttle Video All the Time,
ENGADGET (Aug. 22, 2017), https://www.engadget.com/2017/08/22/verizon-unlimited-plansthrottle-video/ [https://perma.cc/Y4A5-NEQG]; Chris Welch, Verizon's Good Unlimited Data Plan
Is
Now
Three Bad
Unlimited Plans, VERGE
(Aug.
22,
2017,
6:00
AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/8/22/16181362/verizon-new-unlimited-data-plan-video-throttlingnet-neutrality [https://perma.cc/455R-DGV5] ("If you don't mind the possibility of slowed down
data speeds or DVD-quality video, you can opt for the Go Unlimited plan and save a few bucks
compared to the plan introduced in February, which started at $80 for a single line. But new
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video quality degradation with conditional unlimited service options
that typically offer subscribers more monthly data consumption than
previously allowed, subject to throttling during carrier-determined
congestion and when subscribers exceed a more generous cap. By
degrading non-surcharge-paid video traffic, an ISP can offer more
generous data plans without having to invest in additional plant or
even to enhance the speed and bandwidth allocated to handle such
traffic.
Paid prioritization can occur when upstream content sources or
distributors agree to a surcharge demand based on the assumption
that the failure to do so will compel the last mile ISP to degrade traffic
delivery leading to inferior quality of service and broadband
subscriber dissatisfaction. 1 4 4 The previously prohibited practice can
also occur when retail broadband subscribers have to pay the wireless
carrier an additional fee for retention of high-definition video feeds
they previously could stream without a surcharge but subject to a
monthly data allowance. While the carriers may not have to change
the order and sequence in which they deliver high-definition video
traffic, they may have to apply other traffic optimization techniques to
guarantee timely and reliable delivery. The previous rule on paid
prioritization prohibited "techniques such as traffic shaping,
prioritization, resource reservation, or other forms of preferential
traffic management" contingent on a surcharge payment or provided
to an affiliate. 1 4 5
Paid prioritization does not seem to occur when ventures
upstream from the last mile ISP opt to pay a surcharge to a carrier as
insurance against congestion and degraded quality of service. As
noted, some wireless carriers now want their retail subscribers to pay
to retain high-definition video resolution of traffic-a process that
could require more bandwidth, higher transmission speeds, and
possibly deliberate and preferential routing of traffic.
ISPs providing last mile delivery of Internet traffic operate in a
two-sided market and have flexibility in deciding how to recoup costs
from both downstream retail broadband subscribers and upstream
ventures such as nonretail ISPs, content creators, and content

customers who do care about those things will be paying more money each month for essentially
the same service.").
144.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5607-08. "Data caps or allowances,
which limit the amount and type of content users access online, can have a role in providing
consumers options and differentiating services in the marketplace, but they also can negatively
influence customer behavior and the development of new applications." Id. at 5632.
145.
Id. at 5608.
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Like credit card companies, last mile ISPs can
distributors. 14 6
strategically allocate financial burdens between two payment
categories to maximize revenues. 147 Credit card companies may
provide consumers with "free" cards and even ones that provide a
financial rebate with use. 148 For consumers who pay on time, the
credit card company must rely solely on the revenues generated from
upstream vendors who pay a fee each time a card is used.
Broadband subsidies from advertisers, individual sources of
content, and carriers can stop the meter that otherwise would debit a
monthly data downloading and uploading allowance. 149 Subscribers

&

146.
See ROSLYN LAYTON & SILVIA ELALUF CALDERWOOD, CTR. FOR COMMC'N MEDIA
INFO. TECHS., ZERO RATING: Do HARD RULES PROTECT OR HARM CONSUMERS AND COMPETITION?
EVIDENCE FROM CHILE, NETHERLANDS AND SLOVENIA (2015); David S. Evans, The Antitrust

Economics of Multi-Sided Platform Markets, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 325, 328 (2003) ("Platform
businesses compete in 'multi-sided markets.' For example, video game console companies such as
Sony, Nintendo, and Microsoft compete for game developers and users, while payment card
companies such

as American Express, MasterCard, and Visa compete for merchants and

cardholders. Platform businesses must deal with interdependent demand when devising pricing,
production, and investment strategies. These strategies can be quite different from non-platform

businesses that do not serve mutually dependent customer groups. The optimal price on a
particular side of the market, whether measured socially or privately, does not follow marginal
cost on that side of the market. Many platform businesses charge one side little or nothing; for
example, most operating system vendors collect scant revenue from software developers who use
their intellectual property. In many cases, the joint provision of a good that services multiple

groups of customers makes the assignment of costs to any one side arbitrary."); see also Inge
Graef, Sih Yuliana Wahyuningtyas & Peggy Valcke, Assessing Data Access Issues in Online
Platforms, 39 TELECOMM. POL'Y 375, 377 (2015); Daniel M. Tracer, Note, Overcharge but Don't
Overestimate: CalculatingDamages for Antitrust Injuries in Two-Sided Markets, 33 CARDOZO L.
REV. 807, 811 (2011).
147.
See Dany H. Assaf & Rebecca Moskowitz, Global Credit Card Wars: Litigation,
Legislation, or Innovation as a Path to Peace?, ANTITRUST, Spring 2015, at 42-43 ("In assessing
the credit card industry, the courts struggle both with how to define markets as well as whether
market definition is even necessary. Central to this challenge is that the credit card industry is a
two-sided market. In a two-sided market there are two distinct groups (e.g., merchants and
cardholders), which interact through a common, multi-sided platform (e.g., networks-issuersacquirers). Multi-sided platforms need intermediaries to match both parts of the platform in a
more efficient way. Intermediaries create value primarily by enabling efficient and direct
interactions between the groups." (footnotes omitted)).
Steven Semeraro, Assessing the Costs & Benefits of Credit CardRewards: A Response
148.
to Who Gains and Who Loses from Credit Card Payments? Theory and Calibrations, 25 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 30, 31, 73 (2012) ("A card system must provide a service to two distinct
customer

bases, consumers

and merchants.

In such a two-sided market, efficient

pricing

generally requires fee setting that diverges from marginal cost pricing for each customer set.
Just as a newspaper charges advertisers above marginal cost prices so that it can deliver papers
to readers at a price below marginal cost, card systems charge merchants higher fees to enable
the system to attract cardholders and stimulate card use. If merchants fully allocated the cost of
card acceptance to individual card users, the card systems could become less efficient." (footnotes
omitted)).
149.
See BJ Ard, Beyond Neutrality: How Zero Rating Can (Sometimes) Advance User
Choice, Innovation, and Democratic Participation,75 MD. L. REV. 984, 988-1000 (2016); Arturo
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exceeding their monthly data rate incur a surcharge for such an
overage, or they have to make do with throttled service until the next
month of service begins. Many wireless data plans still offer metered
service with only a few gigabytes of content allotted per month, which
subscribers will exhaust with the streaming of a few full-length
movies. 15 0 With skimpy data service allowances, zero rating options
appear particularly attractive.
Extraordinary growth in the demand for downloading and
streaming video, 15 1 along with other "over the top" applications, 15 2
appears to have strengthened last mile ISP negotiation leverage with
downstream subscribers, upstream sources, and distributors of
content alike.
These ISPs have network access pricing power,
particularly in nations lacking robust broadband competition,
including the United States. 153 Even where adequate facilities-based
competition exists, broadband subscribers typically select only one
retail ISP to handle all of their broadband traffic. 154 Notwithstanding
such empirical evidence, the current FCC considers the broadband
marketplace sufficiently competitive despite previous findings that
retail ISPs have both the incentive and the ability to exploit their last

J. Carrillo, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too? Zero-Rating, Net Neutrality, and International
Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 364, 382 (2016); Goodman, supranote 26, at 81.
150.
See,
e.g.,
Unlimited,
VERIZON,
https://www.verizonwireless.com/
b2c/includes/plans/datalnfoOverlay.jsp [https://perma.cclFA2S-5278] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
151.
(2017),

Cisco, Cisco VISuAL NETWORKING INDEX: FORECAST AND METHODOLOGY, 2016-2021
https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/visual-networking-

index-vni/complete-white-paper-cl1-481360.pdf
[https://perma.cc/S5TG-YV6W] ("Globally, IP
video traffic will be 82 percent of all consumer Internet traffic by 2021, up from 73 percent in
2016. Global IP video traffic will grow threefold from 2016 to 2021, a CAGR [cumulative average
growth rate] of 26 percent. Internet video traffic will grow fourfold from 2016 to 2021, a CAGR of
31 percent."); see also AKAMAI, Q1 2017 STATE OF THE INTERNET/CONNECTIVITY REPORT (2017),

https://content.akamai.com/gl-en-pg9135-ql-soti-connectivity.html [https://perma.cc/33S9-R7FY].
152.
2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17916 & n.48 ("Over-the-top VolP [Voice
over Internet Protocol] [and other] services require the end user to obtain broadband
transmission from a third-party provider, and providers of over-the-top [services] can vary in
terms of the extent to which they rely on their own facilities.").
153.
See Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability
to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 31 FCC Red. 699, 700, 712 (Jan. 29, 2016)
[hereinafter 2016 Broadband Progress Report] ("We find that advanced telecommunications
capability is not being deployed to all Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion.")
154.
See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5629-30 ("As the Commission and
the court have recognized, broadband providers are in a position to act as a 'gatekeeper' between
end users' access to edge providers' applications, services, and devices and reciprocally for edge
providers' access to end users. Broadband providers can exploit this role by acting in ways that
may harm the open Internet, such as preferring their own or affiliated content, demanding fees
from edge providers, or placing technical barriers to reaching end users. Without multiple,
substitutable paths to the consumer, and the ability to select the most cost-effective route, edge
providers will be subject to the broadband provider's gatekeeper position." (footnotes omitted)).
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mile "terminating monopoly" in ways that can harm competition and
consumers.15 5
Last mile ISPs have raised broadband subscription rates and
have imposed surcharge requirements from major upstream
generators of traffic. 156 Rate increases can help defray the substantial
investment ISPs have made to handle ever-growing traffic volume,
particularly full-motion video.
However, if such increases do not
reduce subscriber numbers, they also can support the inference that
ISPs can raise rates without suffering subscriber churn because no
lower-cost competitive alternative exists that offers a comparable bit
transmission speed and monthly data allowance.15 7
The last mile broadband marketplace lacks a robust array of
facilities-based alternatives in some nations, including the United
States, where cable television operators dominate.1 55
While other
155.
See id.; see also Verizon v. FCC, 740 F.3d 623, 646 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ("The
Commission also convincingly detailed how broadband providers' position in the market gives
them the economic power to restrict edge-provider traffic and charge for the services they furnish
edge providers. Because all end users generally access the Internet through a single broadband
provider, that provider functions as a 'terminating monopolist,' with power to act as a
'gatekeeper' with respect to edge providers that might seek to reach its end-user subscribers."
(footnotes omitted) (quoting 2010 Open Internet Order, supra note 6, at 17919 & n.66)).
156.
See, e.g., FitzGerald & Ramachandran, supra note 21.
157.

See INDUS. ANALYSIS & TECH. DIV. WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, FCC, INTERNET

ACCESS SERVICES: STATUS AS OF JUNE 30, 2016, at 6 fig.4 (2017) [hereinafter 2016 Broadband
Statistics], https://apps.fcc.gov/edoes-public/attachmatchlDOC-344499A1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
UB5G-AL35). The most recent FCC statistics on the number of broadband service providers
identify a highly concentrated market, especially for very high-speed services. The Commission
reports that 79 percent of all census tracks having occupied housing have three carriers
providing at least 10 Mbps downstream and at least 1 Mbps upstream, with no less than one of
them providing satellite service. Areas with at least 25 Mbps downstream and at least 3 Mbps
upstream have three carriers in 13 percent of all census tracks, with 29 percent having two
options. Areas with at least 100 Mbps downstream and at least 10 Mbps upstream have three
carriers in less than 2 percent of all census tracks, with 10 percent having two options. Id. at 6
fig.4. Seventy percent of all broadband subscribers use wireless carriers with cable modem
service used by 18.1 percent and telephone company digital subscriber line (DSL) service used by
7.7 percent. Id. at 17 fig. 14. However, cable companies provide 72 percent of all fixed connections
having at least 10 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps upstream. Id. at 19 fig.18. The market share
for cable companies increases to 72.5 percent for residences. Id. at 20 fig.20. At the 25 Mbps
downstream and at least 3 Mbps upstream rate, the cable operator market share increases to

82.8 percent of all fixed connections and 83.5 percent for residences. Id. at 21-22 figs.22 & 24.
Cable operators have a 91.6 percent for services having at least 100 Mbps downstream and at
least 10 Mbps upstream. Id. at 24 fig.27.
158.
See id. at 24 fig.27; see also Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced
Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, 31 FCC
Red. 9140, 9141 (Aug. 4, 2016) ("On January 29, 2016, we released the 2016 Broadband Progress
Report, which found that advanced telecommunications capability was not being deployed to all
Americans in a reasonable and timely fashion. We based our finding on the determination that,
despite some advances in the deployment and availability of advanced telecommunications
capability, these advances were not occurring broadly enough, or quickly enough, to satisfy the
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wired and wireless options exist, they each have quality of service and
cost handicaps. Most telephone companies have retrofitted copper
wire telephone lines to provide digital subscriber line (DSL)
broadband service that in many instances cannot accommodate
multiple simultaneous video users. 159 Some of these companies-such
as AT&T 160 and Verizon 16 1-now
offer a faster and higher-capacity
option, using fiber optic cables exclusively or in combination with
existing copper wire plant. However, these companies operate in
selected metropolitan areas that collectively do not come close to
establishing a national service footprint. 162 Satellite options generally
have initial receiving equipment costs, comparatively higher monthly
rates, and lower data allowances than wired options. 163 Additionally,
the length of time it takes to send and receive satellite traffic causes
signal delay (latency) problems for some applications. 1 6 4

goals of section 706. In particular, the 2016 Broadband Progress Report noted that
approximately ten percent of the population-nearly 34 million Americans-lacked access to
fixed advanced telecommunications capability. Further, the 2016 Broadband Progress Report
found a persistent urban-rural divide in access to broadband services, with Americans in rural

areas and on Tribal lands approximately ten times more likely than those Americans in urban
areas to lack access to services able to provide advanced telecommunications capability. The
2016 Broadband Progress Report separately concluded that deployment of advanced
telecommunications capability to schools and classrooms continued to lag behind the needs of
American students and educators." (footnotes omitted) (citing 2016 Broadband Progress Report,
supra note 153, at 701-02, 750-51)).
159.
See ROB FRIEDEN, WINNING THE SILICON SWEEPSTAKES: CAN THE UNITED STATES
COMPETE IN GLOBAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS? 158-62 (2010). The FCC reports that 9.525 million

residential DSL lines can provide broadband service at least 10 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps
upstream, while 54.273 million cable modem lines can operate at this speed. 2016 Broadband
Statistics, supra note 157, at 20 fig.19.
160.
See How AT&T U-verse Works?, AT&T, http://www.att-services.net/att-u-verse/howuverse-works.html [https://perma.ce/9V4D-LHWN] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
161.
See
How
Does
Fiber
Optic
Technology
Work?,
VERIZON,
http://www.verizon.com/support/smallbusiness/internet/fiosinternet/general+support/getting+sta

rted/questionsone/85268.htm [https://perma.cclH7U7-GGQP] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
162.
The FCC reports that 9.239 million residential fiber optic lines can provide
broadband service at least 10 Mbps downstream and 1 Mbps upstream. 2016 Broadband
Statistics, supra note 157, at 20 fig.19; see also How AT&T U-verse Works?, supra note 160
(stating that certain bundled packages are not available in all areas).
163.
See, e.g., Viasat Plans & Pricing, EXEDE, https://www.exedebroadband.comlexedeinternet-plans [https://perma.cc/7URL-7ZST] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
164.
See OFFICE OF ENG'G & TECH. & OFFICE OF STRATEGIC PLANNING & POLICY
ANALYSIS, FCC, 2016 MEASURING BROADBAND AMERICA FIXED BROADBAND REPORT: A REPORT
ON CONSUMER FIXED BROADBAND PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2016),

http://data.fcc.gov/download/measuring-broadband-america/2016/2016-Fixed-MeasuringBroadband-America-Report.pdf [https://perma.cclR5RZ-7KE7] ("Latency is the time it takes for a
data packet to travel across a network from one point on the network to another. High latencies
may affect the perceived quality of some interactive services such as phone calls over the
Internet, video chat, or online multiplayer games. Latencies among terrestrial-based broadband
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Zero rating enables last mile ISPs to shift some or all of the
total content delivery cost away from retail consumers and onto
upstream carriers and sources of content. 165 Alternatively, retail
subscriber surcharges for high-definition video delivery enable last
mile ISPs to offer more generous monthly data allowances. 166 Both
strategies can promote social welfare by increasing the number of
broadband users, which in turn increases the value of access, an
outcome economists label as a positive network externality. 167 With
more and more subscribers joining the bandwagon, Internet content,
accessibility, and value increases. 168 Additional subscribers, including
ones that require inducements, also help carriers accrue economies of
scale-putting them in a comparatively better position to recoup
services are typically small and are unlikely to affect the perceived quality of applications. The
higher latencies of satellite-based broadband services may negatively affect the perceived quality
of such highly interactive applications.").
165.

See STALLMAN & ADAMS, supra note 26, at 2.

166.

Degrading video content streams reduces the bandwidth needed to deliver such

content, thereby abating the pressure on ISPs to make additional investments in network

capacity.
Verizon slowed data speeds last week for customers attempting to stream video, an
action that worried net neutrality advocates as the current rules against throttling
connections are potentially on the Federal Communications Commission's chopping
block. In response, Verizon denies it did anything wrong. The telecom giant was
performing a routine "video optimization" test that did not affect customers' video
experience, a Verizon spokesperson told USA TODAY.
Rachel Sandler, Verizon Slows Video Traffic, Causing Concerns for Net Neutrality Advocates,
USA TODAY (July 26, 2017, 6:45 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech2017/07/26/verizon[https://perma.cc/
slows-video-traffic-causing-concerns-net-neutrality-advocates/5 13248001/
C98F-MUJ2]. Wireless carriers now offer plans that do not degrade video quality, but at higher
rates than plans that do. Currently, Verizon offers two unlimited rate plan types: Go Unlimited
and Beyond Unlimited. The former offers lower rates, but when the service supports broadband
access by additional devices-a process commonly referred to as tethering-video quality is
degraded

and

transmission

speed

slows

https://www.verizonwireless.com/plans/verizon-plan/
Jan. 13, 2018).

substantially.

See

VERIZON,

Unlimited,

[https://perma.cc/8N6J-5L5P]

(last visited

See DOUG BRAKE, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., MOBILE ZERO RATING: THE
167.
ECONOMICS AND INNOVATION BEHIND FREE DATA 9 (2016), http://www2.itif.org/2016-zerorating.pdf [https://perma.cc/EA5H-SE9U]; JEFFREY A. EISENACH, NAT'L ECON. RESEARCH

Assocs.

ECON.

CONSULTING,

THE

ECONOMICS

OF

ZERO

RATING

5

(2015),

http://www.nera.com/content/damlnera/publications/2015/EconomicsofZeroRating.pdf

[https://perma.cc/2C2D-ZPNN].
See EISENACH, supra note 167, at 5. Broadband networks achieve positive network
168.
externalities as the number of access points and subscribers increase. For background on this
economic concept, see John Farrell & Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and
Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70-71 (1985); Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network
Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 424 (1985); see also Mark
A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV.
479, 483 (1998); Carl Shapiro, Exclusivity in Network Industries, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 673, 673
(1999).

696

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:3:655

substantial sunk costs incurred in erecting and frequently upgrading
robust networks capable of handling peak traffic requirements
generated by consumer streaming of video content.
Broadband
infrastructure requires substantial initial investment, but the
marginal cost of traffic switching and transmission traffic from one
additional subscriber approaches zero. 169
However, both zero rating and high-definition video surcharges
can distort the marketplace of ideas by creating financial inducements
for accessing specific content offered at a discount and by imposing
higher charges for accessing video with greater line resolution. In
both instances, ISPs may distort the content marketplace by creating
financial incentives for consumers to favor subsidized, zero rated
content and to tolerate delivery of low resolution content.
Last mile ISPs can favor or disadvantage content on the basis
of what kind of special financial arrangement they can negotiate. Not
every instance of specialized negotiations and surcharge demand
would constitute unlawful discrimination, particularly if an ISP can
prove that its carriage of specific traffic triggered an extraordinary
burden on network resources. However, there are routing scenarios
where, even if such a burden existed, the FCC prohibited content
carriage downgrading.
For example, when the FCC mandated the
transition from analog to digital broadcast television, it implemented
a preexisting legislative mandate requiring cable television operators
to carry broadcast channels without any option to downgrade
high-definition video content to a lower screen resolution.17 0 Two
provisions in the Cable Act of 1992 bar cable operators from degrading
the video line resolution of commercial and noncommercial broadcast
television content they retransmit, even though cable operators
qualify as private carriers, free of a common carrier mandate to
operate without unreasonable discrimination.1 7 1
Network neutrality advocates fear the next "killer application"
or source of "must see" content would not get a fair marketplace trial if
such new ventures cannot afford to pay surcharges. 172
In this

169.
See BRAKE, supra note 167, at 6; EISENACH, supra note 167, at 4-5.
170.
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, §§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-81 (1992) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§
534(b)(4)(A), 535(g)(2) (2012)) (requiring cable operators to carry signals of commercial and
noncommercial broadcast television stations "without material degradation").
171.
Id.; see FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 708-09 (1979) ("The Commission
may not regulate cable systems as common carriers, just as it may not impose such obligations
on television broadcasters.").
172.

See, e.g., Susan Crawford, Introducing the Comcast Tax, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 24,

2014, 2:24 PM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-02-24/introducing-the-comcast-tax
[https://perma.cclEH3F-R9A4]; Cecilia Kang, What's Next After the Repeal of Net Neutrality, N.Y.
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scenario, incumbents maintain or possibly strengthen their market
dominance not by offering superior products and services, but by
reducing opportunities for startup ventures to acquire market
share. 173 Zero rating "hurts consumers because it allows providers to
create artificial scarcity of choice and 'corrupt the growth of online
services."' 174 Arguably, a surcharge for receiving high-definition
content also hurts consumers because content providers may avoid
triggering a surcharge payment decision by degrading the screen
resolution of content using a now-inferior and obsolete video
presentation format.
IV. CONTENT INTERFERENCE AND NETWORK NEUTRALITY

Advocates for strong network neutrality safeguards consider
zero rating and video surcharges the latest assaults on an open
Internet operating without biased carriers having the ability to
meddle with the speed and quality of their content carriage. 175 ISPs
have devised many types of pricing plans, 176 but the emphasis appears
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/15/technology/net-neutrality2017),
(Dec.
15,
TIMES
repeal.html [https:/perma.cclLAU6-YJ3T]; Tim Wu, Comcast Versus the Open Internet, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.newyorker.com/techlelements/comcast-versus-the-openinternet [https://perma.cc/7ZP7-L5ZDI.
See Rebecca Curwin, Note, Unlimited Data, but a Limited Net: How Zero-Rated
173.
Partnerships Between Mobile Service Providers and Music-Streaming Apps Violate Net
Neutrality, 17 COLUM. Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 204, 210 (2015); Jeremy Gillula & Jeremy Malcolm,
Internet.org Is Not Neutral, Not Secure, and Not the Internet, ELECTRONIC FREEDOM FOUND.:
DEEPLINKS BLOG (May 18, 2015), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2015/05/internetorg-not-neutralnot-secure-and-not-internet [https://perma.cc/2KWU-PYMR].

Richard A. Starr, Comment, Net Neutrality: On Mobile Broadband Carriersand the
174.
Open Internet, the Commercially Reasonable Network Management Standard, and the Need for
Greater Protection of the Open Internet, 11 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 89, 103 (2016) (quoting Gautham
Nagesh, Mobile Networks Caught in 'Open Internet' Debate, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 16, 2014, 8:05
http://www.wsj.com/articles/net-neutrality-heats-up-again-over-mobile-data- 1410905961
PM),
[https://perma.cclU4HC-6GXN]).
See, e.g., Klint Finley, The FCC OKs Streaming for Free-but Net Neutrality Will
175.
Pay, WIRED (Feb. 3, 2017, 8:00 PM) https://www.wired.com/2017/02/fcc-oks-streaming-free-netneutrality-will-pay/ [https://perma.cc/4HTN-WZDA]; Swanner, supranote 28.
See, e.g., Binge On, T-MOBILE, http://www.t-mobile.com/offer/binge-on-streaming176.
video.html [https://perma.cclGK8F-2LHP] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018); go90 FAQs, VERIZON,
https://www.verizonwireless.com/support/go9o-faqs/ [https://perma.cc/9MLC-RRGE] (last visited
http://www.att.com/att/
AT&T,
Sponsored Data from AT&T,
2018);
13,
Jan.
(last visited Jan. 13, 2018);
sponsoreddata/en/index.htm1 [https://perma.cc/AX2E-4UML]
XFINITY Stream Package FAQs, XFINITY, https://customer.xfinity.com/help-and-support/cabletv/stream-faqs [https://perma.cc/M5NW-AJSF] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
Comcast has announced plans to offer Netflix access via the company's set-top box. Klint
Finley, Comcast's Netflix Deal Could Open a New Front in Net Neutrality War, WIRED (July 8,
http://www.wired.com/2016/07/comcasts-netflix-deal-open-new-front-netAM),
7:00
2016,
neutrality-warl [https://perma.cc/9VBP-VU6K]. This arrangement may create new network
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in upselling existing subscribers to a more expensive service tier that
offers a higher data allotment, reduces subscriber cancellation of
service ("churn"), and stimulates greater interest in streaming video

services.

177

In the United States, many zero rating options currently
exist-despite
vocal opposition by some network
neutrality
advocates. 178 In its 2015 Open Internet Order, the FCC did not
explicitly ban zero rating, opting instead to use a case-by-case
of whether the tactic harms competition and
examination
consumers. 179 This evaluation would have assessed whether a specific
zero rating option violated a general prohibition on practices "that
unreasonably interfere with or unreasonably disadvantage the ability
of consumers to reach the Internet content, services, and applications
of their choosing or of edge providers to access consumers using the
Internet."1 0
Professor Barbara van Schewick made presentations to officials
at the FCC asserting that zero rating plans, like that offered by
wireless carrier T-Mobile, violate network neutrality principles.811
She asserted that the arrangement achieves many of the harmful
outcomes resulting from practices outlawed by the FCC-for example,
deliberate traffic blocking and slowing as well as offering to prioritize
specific traffic for additional compensation. 1 8 2 Professor van Schewick
neutrality enforcement issues if the streaming of Netflix content qualifies for zero rating or
access without a broadband subscription. Id.
177.
See Jeff Dunn, AT&T Is Playing Favorites on the Internet with Its Own TV Service,
Could Hurt Competition, Bus.
INSIDER
(Nov.
28,
2016,
8:20 PM),
Which
http://www.businessinsider.com/att-directv-now-net-neutrality-zero-rating-2016-11
[https://perma.cc/5B2Z-BFRUJ] (discussing AT&T's zero rating offer of its DirecTV content to
wireless broadband subscribers who add the direct broadcast satellite (DBS) video service).
178.

2017 WIRELESS TELECOMM. BUREAU ZERO RATING REPORT, supra note 63, at 8-10.

As of early 2017, AT&T, Verizon, and T-Mobile had zero rating options available to their millions
of wireless subscribers. Id.

179.
2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5668.
180.
Id. at 5659. The FCC concluded that it should "adopt a governing standard that
looks to whether consumers or edge providers face unreasonable interference or unreasonable
disadvantages, and makes clear that the standard is not limited to whether a practice is
agreeable to commercial parties." Id. at 5666.
181.

See, e.g.,

BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, T-MOBILE'S

BINGE ON VIOLATES KEY NET

NEUTRALITY PRINCIPLES 3-5 (2016), https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/downloads/vanSchewick-2016Binge-On-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/SV9Y-RMQR]; see also van Schewick, supra note 11, at
113; Barbara van Schewick, STAN. L. SCH., http://cyberlaw.stanford.edulabout/people/barbaravan-schewick [https://perma.cc/9AC5-G9A2] (last visited Feb. 11, 2018).
182.
VAN SCHEWICK, supra note 181, at 3 ("In November 2015, T-Mobile, the third largest
provider of mobile Internet access in the U.S., launched a new service called Binge On that offers
'unlimited' video streaming from selected providers. Customers on qualifying plans can stream
video from forty-two providers in Binge On-Netflix, Amazon, Hulu, HBO, and others-without
using their data plans, a practice known as zero-rating. As currently offered, Binge On violates
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argued that zero rating distorts competition, limits user choice, stifles
free expression, and harms innovation. 183 She ultimately suggested
that T-Mobile could avoid violating network neutrality principles by
offering a zero rating option at a lower bit transmission speed for all
traffic, offering unlimited video service, or expanding the monthly
data allowance for all subscribers. 184
Senior management at the FCC have sent mixed messages to
stakeholders. On one hand, former FCC Chairman Thomas Wheeler
expressed support for specific zero rating plans, including ones that
offer unmetered access to popular video programming sources such as
Netflix, YouTube, HBO, ESPN, and Hulu, as well as music content
key net neutrality principles and harms user choice, innovation, competition, and free speech
online. As a result, the program is likely to violate the FCC's general conduct rule.").
183.
Id. at 3-4.
First, Binge On distorts competition. Research shows that customers prefer zero-rated
content over content that uses their data plans. As a result, Binge On video is
automatically more attractive to customers because it is zero-rated. Providers in
Binge On enjoy a competitive advantage, not based on merit but simply because
T-Mobile added them to its program....
Second, Binge On limits user choice. Customers on T-Mobile's lowest qualifying plan
can watch unlimited video from Netflix and other Binge On providers until they reach
their cap, but not more than 42 hours of video per month, or 9 minutes per day, from
providers not included in Binge On. This is not a meaningful choice.
Third, Binge On stifles free expression. The forty-two providers currently in Binge On
deliver mostly commercial video entertainment - not user-generated, educational or
non-profit video....
Fourth, Binge On harms innovation. The Internet was built on a central principle: As
long as innovators respect fundamental Internet standards, they can reach people all
over the world at low costs. Binge On changes that. It requires video providers to work
with T-Mobile to join Binge On and, in many cases, to change their service to meet the
ISP's technical requirements.
Id.
184.

Id. at 31.

First, T-Mobile could offer customers a zero-rated low-bandwidth mode at the same
speed as Binge On. Use of that mode would not count against the cap, but customers
would be able to use this mode however way they choose: They could watch video or do
anything else online. This plan is similar to Binge On in its current form but without
the host of net neutrality concerns.

Second, T-Mobile could allow customers unlimited access to the entire Internet after
customers reach their cap, just at a slower speed - the same speed currently offered
through Binge On. After reaching their cap, customers could watch video or do
anything else online; it would be their choice. This plan offers customers truly
unlimited video.
Third, T-Mobile could increase the monthly data caps on its capped plans to account
for the average amount of video that people are watching. Customers could use that
additional bandwidth to do anything online, including watching video. Again, it would
be their choice.
Id. (emphasis in original).

700

VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.

[Vol. 20:3:655

from popular sources such as Pandora, Rhapsody, iHeartRadio, iTunes
Radio, Slacker, and Spotify.18 5

On the other hand, the Wireless

Bureau of the FCC tentatively concluded that some zero rating plans
may violate network neutrality rules and requirements. 186 Most
recently, the Acting Chief of the Wireless Bureau terminated
examination of wireless carriers' zero rating offers.1 87 This decision
appears to confirm that broadband Internet access providers have no
regulatory impediments when offering zero rating options, including
ones that eliminate metering for content offered by a corporate
affiliate. For example, before AT&T offered expanded unlimited data
plans, the company offered an attractive upselling option for wireless
subscribers to add DirecTV video and have that content zero rated. 8
The FCC previously notified AT&T that such a practice might violate
the paid prioritization prohibition rule established in the 2015 Open
Internet Order.1 89

185.
See Jon Brodkin, T-Mobile's Data Cap Exemption for Video Gets FCC Chairman's
Approval, ARS TECHNICA (Nov. 19, 2015, 1:28 PM), http://arstechnica.com/business/2015/11/tmobiles-data-cap-exemption-for-video-gets-fcc-chairmans-approval
[https://perma.cclMBP9P2TY].
186.
2017 WIRELESS TELECOMM. BUREAU ZERO RATING REPORT, supra note 63, at 17.
Wireless Telecommunications Bureau Report: Policy Review of Mobile Broadband
187.
Operators' Sponsored Data Offerings for Zero Rated Content and Services, 32 FCC Red. 1093
(Feb. 3, 2017) (setting aside and rescinding a previously issued Policy Review Report and any
and all guidance, determinations, and conclusions contained therein, including the document's
draft framework); see also Thomas Gryta, FCC Ends 'Zero-Rating'Review, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3,
2017,
4:34
PM),
https://www.wsj.comlarticles/fcc-ends-zero-rating-review- 1486157682
[https:/perma.cc/E739-B9GM].
188.
Daniel Frankel, AT&T to 'Go Hard' on Zero Rating, CEO Stephenson Says, FIERCE
CABLE (Jan. 25, 2017, 5:41 PM), http://www.fiercecable.com/cable/at-t-to-go-hard-zero-rating-ceostephon-says [https://perma.cc/N87Z-WJ8J] ("AT&T teased its earnings call by revealing last
week that more than 200,000 customers have signed up for its virtual pay-TV service since it
launched Nov. 30 [2016]. Those customers can stream DirecTV Now video on AT&T's mobile
network without it counting against their usage caps.").
189.
See Letter from Thomas Wheeler, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, to Edward J.
Markey, U.S. Senator (Jan. 11, 2017), http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily-Releases/Daily-Business/
2017/dbO111/DOC-342982A1.pdf [https://perma.cclMTW2-NHRN] (confirming concerns that zero
rating of content offered by a corporate affiliate can violate the FCC's 2015 Open Internet Order);
see also Marguerite Reardon, FCC Slams AT&T and Verizon over Zero-Rating Offers, CNET
(Dec. 2, 2016, 4:45 PM), https://www.cnet.com/news/fcc-att-verizon-zero-rating-directv-now-go90net-neutrality/ [https://perma.cc/H2E6-EYPF] ("The Federal Communications Commission is not
cool with AT&T's offer that lets customers stream the carrier's DirecTV service without it
counting against their data plans. The commission has also launched an investigation into a
similar offer from Verizon. In a letter sent to AT&T on Thursday, the agency said it's reached a
preliminary conclusion that the carrier is violating net neutrality rules, which prohibit internet
service providers from favoring their own content over a competitor's service.").
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A. Is Zero Rating the BroadbandEquivalent to Toll-Free Telephone
Calls?
Advocates for zero rating consider the option the broadband
equivalent to earlier-in-time subsidy arrangements such as toll-free
telephone calling. 190 Both pricing arrangements eliminate or reduce
consumers' direct, out-of-pocket costs for accessing a service. Both use
payments by an upstream vendor to defray the costs incurred by
downstream consumers.
Additionally, each model shows how
consumers in a two-sided market can avoid or reduce costs when some
vendors agree to defray both the cost of content creation and its
delivery. After all, few object when a brick-and-mortar vendor offers
to waive shipping, handling, and other delivery charges that would
have raised consumers' out-of-pocket costs.
On the other hand, one can readily differentiate the mass
media broadcast of advertising to a large audience from a selective
subsidy aiming to increase traffic to specific Internet-mediated content
and services by individuals.
Providers of toll-free long distance
telephone service operate in such a robustly competitive marketplace
that the FCC largely deregulated the market starting in 1980.191
Some vendors of products and services see a marketing advantage in
removing a minor cost that typically constitutes more of an irritant
than a barrier to consummation of the transaction. Defraying the cost
of a long-distance telephone charge does not intentionally expand the
socioeconomic range of prospective customers. Vendors absorb toll
charges much like they might reimburse customers for vehicle parking
fees, or offer to waive shipping and handling fees for customers
reaching an aggregate purchase threshold.
B. DifferentiatingFree WiFi from Free or Reduced-Cost Broadband
Zero rating plans have some parallels with free WiFi access,
but significant differences exist as well. Both use subsidies to provide
broadband access, and both types of subsidizers expect to accrue

190.
MULTICULTURAL MEDIA, TELECOM & INTERNET COUNCIL, supra note 31, at 3 ("In the
communications space, this [subsidy] model has deep roots. Over-the-air broadcast television and
radio has always been free because programming is subsidized by advertisers. Most websites rely
on the same dynamic. Similarly, toll-free calling, which has been around for nearly 50 years,
remains enormously popular among consumers and companies alike."); see also WILLIAM P.
ROGERSON, CELLULAR TELECOMM. INDUS. ASS'N, THE ECONOMICS OF DATA CAPS AND FREE DATA

SERVICES IN MOBILE BROADBAND (2016), https://www.ctia.org/docs/default-source/defaultdocument-library/081716-rogerson-free-data-white-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/239C-6GYT].
191.
See Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services
and Facilities Authorizations Therefor, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 10-11 (Nov. 28, 1980).
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something of value in return. 192 Commercial and noncommercial WiFi
subsidizers expect to generate either quantifiable benefits-for
example, more coffee sales-or less measurable public benefits, like a
more vibrant central business district. Likewise, zero rating providers
seek to increase revenues by upselling existing subscribers to more
expensive service bundles that combine broadband and other services,
such as video, or that offer more generous data allowances, higher
video delivery quality, and better options for combining ("tethering")
other devices requiring broadband access. Nonquantifiable benefits
include improved public relations and image as a venture that can
jointly enhance value for shareholders while also promoting social
welfare.
WiFi and zero rated broadband access substantially differ in
geographical scope and overall impact. Typically, WiFi access occurs
in small islands of connectivity having no way to serve mobile users.
WiFi hotspots, however, provide broadband access in specific, fixed
commercial (e.g., coffee shops) and noncommercial (e.g., libraries)
locations. 193 Zero rated service offers subsidies primarily to wireless
mobile users throughout a nation. 194 Free WiFi has increasingly
192.
See, e.g., SAMANTHA BATES, CHRISTOPHER BAVITZ & KIRA HESSEIEL, HARVARD
UNIV., ZERO RATING & INTERNET ADOPTION: THE ROLE OF TELCOS, ISPS, & TECHNOLOGY
COMPANIES
IN
EXPANDING
GLOBAL
INTERNET
11
(2017),
ACCESS

https://dash.harvard.edu/bitstream/handle/1/33982356/2017-10_zerorating.pdf~sequence=1
[https://perma.cc/9XXP-AZ6T]; Zero Rating: Free Access to Content, but at What Price?, OXERA
(July
2016),
https://www.oxera.com/Latest-Thinking/Agenda/2016/Zero-rating-free-access-to-

content,-but-at-what-pr.aspx [https://perma.cclLUH3-EATB]. Government WiFi subsidies serve
broad goals such as promoting a business district and providing access to people unwilling or
financially unable to pay for access via more expensive cellular networks. Zero rating offered by
commercial ventures aims to expand the total number of users, including ones that would not
otherwise participate absent a financial subsidy. See BATES, BAVITZ & HESSEKIEL, supra, at 5.

"Free" WiFi serves many types of commercial motivations including inducements to buy on-site
goods and services and, perhaps, to consume more when given the opportunity to linger and
access the Internet. See, e.g., Eric Geier, How to Set Up Public Wi-Fi at Your Business, PCWORLD
(Mar. 27, 2013, 2:13 PM), https://www.pcworld.com/article/2031443/how-to-set-up-public-wi-fi-atyour-business.html [https://perma.cc/8RMF-GRKE]. Before the onset of commercial and
government-subsidized broadband access, many governments created and oversaw national voice

and data subsidy programs. See, e.g., Lifeline Support for Affordable Communications, FED.
COMMC'NS

communications

COMM'N,

https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/lifeline-support-affordable-

[https://perma.cc/P39T-4BN3]

Broadband Pilot Program, FED. COMMC'NS

(last updated

Sept.

8,

2017);

Low-Income

COMM'N, https://www.fec.gov/general/low-income-

broadband-pilot-program-0 [https://perma.cc/MFG4-QKAN] (last updated May 22, 2015). With
the exception of municipal government-owned or subsidized WiFi programs, both zero rating and
most WiFi access initiatives primarily have private managers. See MULTICULTURAL MEDIA,
TELECOM & INTERNET COUNCIL, supra note 31, at 9.

193.
See Thomas J. Fitzgerald, Thrifty Wi-Fi That Travels with You, N.Y. TIMES (June 2,
2010), https://info.internet.org/en/story/where-weve-launched/ [https://perma.cclX3LB-J7GRI.
194.
See Where We've Launched, INTERNET.ORG, https://info.internet.org/en/story/whereweve-launched/ [https://perma.cc/Q583-2ZV7] (last visited Jan. 13, 2018).
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become a welcomed amenity, while zero rated service is mostly viewed
as a new marketing strategy. 195 Most WiFi hotspot users appear to
appreciate having the opportunity to avoid debiting their expensive
monthly wireless data plan, as opposed to having first-time access to
broadband services.
WiFi access typically occurs on an ad hoc, occasional basis
a
user happens to be located within the small "footprint" of
when
196
Subscribers to zero rated services typically use the service
access.
frequently and in many locations via mobile handsets. Arguably, WiFi
access provides a free option to many users who otherwise could resort
to metered service, while zero rated service may constitute the only
affordable option available.
V. THE CHALLENGE FOR NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES

Zero rating offers identifiable and possibly measurable
advantages but also presents harms that are not as easily detected or
Advocates for zero rating may show an aggregate
assessed.19 7
increase in broadband wireless access and may produce statistics
identifying improved market penetration, particularly to underserved
segments. 19 8 Opponents can identify several negative consequences, 199

See 2015 Open Internet Order, supra note 7, at 5608 n.18. The 2015 Open Internet
195.
Order provided no reasonable network management exception to the prohibition on paid
prioritization based on the conclusion that carrier offers result solely from business strategies.
Id. ("Unlike the no-blocking and no-throttling rules, there is no 'reasonable network
management' exception to the paid prioritization rule because paid prioritization is inherently a
business practice rather than a network management practice.").

See Fitzgerald, supra note 193.
196.
ROSSINI & MOORE, supra note 26, at 12 ("The clear benefits of providing even limited
197.
access at an affordable price must be balanced against the potential harms both to those
individuals receiving access and the macro effects on the Internet and competition as a whole.").
See, e.g., Trefis Team, Is "Free Basics" the Right Strategy for Facebook?, FORBES
198.
(Jan. 4, 2016, 8:34 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2016/01/04/is-free-basics("Facebook
[https://perma.cclL2NP-YWDQ]
the-right-strategy-for-facebook/#9b992 105673d
claims that 3 million people in Egypt signed up for the 'Free Basics' service which started in the
region two months ago, of which 1 million received internet access for the first time.").
199.
See Issie Lapowsky, Mark Zuckerberg Can't Have It Both Ways on Net Neutrality,
WIRED (Apr. 17, 2015, 2:08 PM), https://www.wired.com/2015/04/internet-org-zero-rating/
[https://perma.cc/LPA6-6BTZ] ("For the companies, it means the power to decide which Internet
users they're able to reach is out of their hands. Instead, it's up to Internet.org, local
governments, and carriers to decide which services are vital enough to secure a space within the
Internet.org app. And for users, it means having access to only a sliver of what is supposed to be

the worldwide web. . . . It can also create the expectation that access to the Internet always will
be free, a mindset that ... can be difficult to overcome."); Mahesh Murthy, Poor Internet for Poor
People: Why Facebook'sInternet.orgAmounts to Economic Racism, QUARTZ INDIA (Apr. 17, 2015),

https://qz.com/38582 1/poor-internet-for-poor-people-why-facebooks-internet-org-amounts-toeconomic-racism/ [https:/perma.cc/K4RZ-R6GN]; Savethelnternet.in Coalition, Dear Mark
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but they neither actually show causality nor quantify the direct and
attributable harms caused to existing and potential content providers
and broadband subscribers. 200
The impact of purposefully degraded video content carriage has
a more easily measured effect. When an ISP reduces video screen
resolution unless subscribers pay a surcharge, the carrier has forced a
new cost-benefit analysis: namely, subscribers can enjoy more liberal
data access, albeit at lower quality, or they can pay more to receive
content the way creators and distributors intended it to be viewed. In
effect, ISPs give with one hand and take with the other. They appear
to offer an unmetered, unlimited data access, but in reality, they slow
the data delivery of a major portion of the traffic by degrading its
eventual display.
Arguably,
when
degrade
content
ISPs
display, they
significantly impede consumers' quality of experience as well as the
quality of service provided to content creators by degrading their
offerings to an inferior, less network-intensive carriage. 20 1 Requiring

Zuckerberg, Facebook Is Not, and Should Not Be the Internet, HINDUSTAN TIMES (Apr. 17, 2015,
1:02
AM),
http://www.hindustantimes.com/tech/dear-mark-zuckerberg-facebook-is-not-andshould-not-be-the-internet/story-w9S3uhnEYVP8L85EtbTqCO.html
[https://perma.ccl5VPLXBD4]; Marcus Wohisen, Free Mobile Data Plans Are Going to Crush the Startup Economy,
WIRED (Aug. 1, 2014, 6:30 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/08/free-mobile-data-plans-are-goingto-crush-the-startup-economy/ [https://perma.cc/ER8P-4B7S].
200.
See MONICA BONILLA ET AL., GLOB. VOICES ADVOX, FREE BASICS IN REAL LIFE (2017),
https://advox.globalvoices.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/08/
FreeBasicsinRealLife FINALJuly27.pdf [https://perma.cclY83N-VAB7]; Can Facebook Connect
the
Next
Billion?,
GLOBAL
VOICES
ADVOX
(July
27,
2017,
12:00
PM),
https:/advox.globalvoices.org/2017/07/27/can-facebook-connect-the-next-billion/
[https://perma.cc/C5AU-WJPA].
201.
See Rob Frieden, The Mixed Blessing in Subsidized Internet Access, 15 COLO. TECH.
L.J. 269, 275-76 (2017); Andrew Patrick & Eric Scharphorn, Network Neutrality and the First
Amendment, 22 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 93, 93 (2015) ("Though its growth continues
to be phenomenal, broadband service providers-acting as Internet gatekeepers-have developed
the ability to discriminate against specific content and applications. First, these gatekeepers
intercept and inspect data transferred over public networks, then selectively block or slow it.
This practice has the potential to stifle the Internet's value as a speech platform by
compromising its neutral and open architecture, which has traditionally limited the ability of
both public and private entities to engage in censorship."); see also Marvin Ammori, Beyond
Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED.
COMM. L.J. 273, 277-281 (2009); John Blevins, The New Scarcity: A First Amendment
Framework for Regulating Access to Digital Media Platforms, 79 TENN. L. REV. 353, 365-70
(2012); Rob Frieden, Invoking and Avoiding the First Amendment: How Internet Service
Providers Leverage Their Status as Both Content Creators and Neutral Conduits, 12 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 1279, 1284, 1289-90 (2010); Stephanie Kan, Comment, Split Net Neutrality: Applying
Traditional First Amendment Protections to the Modern Interweb, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1149,
1161-62 (2016); Alexander Owens, Comment, ProtectingFree Speech in the DigitalAge: Does the
FCC's Net Neutrality Order Violate the FirstAmendment?, 23 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 209, 215
(2013).
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additional payment to restore content to its intended high-definition
format provides the ISP with a new opportunity to exploit its
intermediary platform by upselling retail subscribers or imposing new
surcharges on upstream content providers in ways that create
financial impediments to maximizing consumer welfare. Congress
enacted a prohibition on cable television operator degradation of
screen resolution to promote the migration from analog to a more
spectrum-efficient digital broadcast format, 202 but perhaps also to
foreclose cable operators from conditioning carriage of more
bandwidth-intensive content on a surcharge borne by upstream video
networks, downstream cable subscribers, or both.
It also appears that cable operators could have generated
evidence that they regularly have to make costly infrastructure
enhancements
to facilitate the carriage
of uncompressed,
high-definition video content, coupled with the need to replace the
existing set-top box interface between the cable network and
subscribers' new high-definition television sets.
Indeed, when
Congress enacted the Cable Act of 1992, it established an
unconditional requirement of broadcast signal retransmission without
any permissible quality degradation and with no reference to cost
recovery. 203 However, even if a legislative prohibition did not exist,
one can imagine substantial cable television subscriber resistance to
any surcharge based on screen display resolution. 204 So far, it appears
that wireless ISPs have created an acceptable package of benefits and
costs by combining more generous data allowances with degraded
video resolution.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
NRAs flirt with political turmoil and citizen revolt when

creating rules and regulations that prevent the perception or
realization of out-of-pocket cost savings for consumers, particularly for

202.
47 U.S.C. § 534(b)(3)(A) (2012) ("A cable operator shall carry in its entirety, on the
cable system of that operator, the primary video, accompanying audio, and line 21 closed caption
transmission of each of the local commercial television stations carried on the cable system and,
to the extent technically feasible, program-related material carried in the vertical blanking
interval or on subcarriers.").

203.
Id. § 534(b)(4)(A) ("The signals of local commercial television stations that a cable
operator carries shall be carried without material degradation.").
204.

Similar

pushback

occurred

when directors,

actors,

and consumers

saw

that

reformatting movies for television broadcast degraded the viewing experience and even deleted
part of the film image from display. See, e.g., Wheeler Winston Dixon, Frame by Frame: Pan and
Scan, U. NEB.-LINCOLN: MEDIAHUB (Dec. 15, 2010), https://mediahub.unl.edulmedia/1659
[https://perma.cc/5SK4-7ZQS].
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a product or service increasingly considered essential. Zero rating
offers reduced or eliminated consumer costs with opportunities to "test
drive" the Internet by accessing a tiny, curated sliver of content,
primarily in developing countries, and to conserve data allowances in
developed countries.
Conditional, "unlimited" service plans offer a
larger monthly data allowance even though subscribers have to accept
lower-resolution video display and throttled transmission speeds both
during periods of possible congestion and for exceeding a
still-enforceable data usage cap. 2 0 5
On balance, significant benefits accruable from zero rating and
more generous data plans warrant inclusion in the collection of lawful
carrier strategies for promoting broadband service.
Zero rating
creates new incentives on the demand side, while most governmental
universal service initiatives have concentrated on supply-side
stimulation with financial subsidies flowing to carriers. 206 NRAs
should embrace zero rating as one of many demand-side stimulation
strategies to raise interest in broadband services by people lacking
discretionary income or an understanding of the individual and
societal benefits generated by Internet access.
NRAs also should allow ISPs to couple more liberal data
allowances with lower-resolution video delivery. However, ISPs must
fully explain to consumers the trade-offs, including the disclosure that
they will degrade video quality ostensibly to conserve bandwidth.
ISPs should have to confront consumer pushback at deliberate quality

205.
advertised

"[V]ery few providers actually offer a truly unlimited plan, even though many have
such

plans

as

'unlimited."'

UNLIMITED

MOBILE

BROADBAND

PLANS,

http://www.unlimitedmobilebroadbandplans.com/ [https://perma.cc/68FV-EUJU3] (last updated
May 18, 2015).
206.
See, e.g., Connect America Fund: Universal Service Reform-Mobility Fund, 32
F.C.C.R. 2152, 2154 (Mar. 7, 2017) (establishing rules for universal service funding targeted at
"up to $4.53 billion over the next decade to advance the deployment of 4G LTE service to areas
that are so costly that the private sector has not yet deployed there and to preserve such service
where it might not otherwise exist"); Connect America Fund: Universal Service
Reform-Mobility Fund: ETC Annual Reports and Certifications, 29 FCC Rcd. 7051, 7053 (June
10, 2014) (implementing auctioned access to universal service funding); Connect America Fund
et al.: Universal Service Reform-Mobility Fund, 26 FCC Rcd. 17663 (Nov. 18, 2011) (promoting
much-needed reforms in universal service funding procedures and policies); Mark Cooper, The
Long History and Increasing Importance of Public-Service Principles for 21st Century Public
Digital Communications Networks, 12 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 1 (2014); Rob Frieden,
Assessing the Need for More Incentives to Stimulate Next Generation Network Investment, 7 I/S:
J.L. & POL'Y FOR INFO. SOC'Y 207 (2012); Krishna P. Jayakar & Harmeet Sawhney, Universal
Service: Beyond Established Practice to Possibility Space, 28 TELECOMM. POLY 339 (2004);
Universal Service, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, https://www.fcc.gov/generalluniversal-service
[https://perma.cclVZP8-YBK2] (last updated Jan. 23, 2018); Universal Service Support
Mechanisms, FED. COMM'NS COMM'N, https://www.fcc.gov/consumers/guides/universal-service-

support-mechanisms [https://perma.cc/4R8N-DR35] (last updated Sept. 8, 2017).
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of service degradation, particularly if wireless subscribers attempt to
substitute larger video screens-such as television sets-for the small
smartphone screen where lines-of-resolution degradation is less
perceptible.
Embracing and supporting zero rating parallels ongoing
government efforts to promote greater broadband market penetration
with cross-subsidies, typically flowing from existing consumers to
either prospective or impoverished ones. 2 07 Governments structure
universal service funding initiatives to achieve the greatest progress
with the least amount of marketplace distortion. 208 Such calibration
and attention to detail also should apply to governmental assessment
of zero rating and unlimited data initiatives.
A sophisticated assessment of zero rating broadband access
and video degradation rejects exaggerated claims that subsidies will
dismantle an open Internet, thwart competition, and eliminate
incentives for innovation. Such scrutiny also dispels the summary
conclusion that zero rating and video degradation cannot possibly
cause any harm to consumers, competition, and the marketplace of
ideas. If completely left to the whims and marketing strategies of
major incumbent carriers and content providers, subsidies can bolster
the status quo and make it even more unlikely for a disruptive
technology, content source, or application creator to acquire a
sustainable market share. On the other hand, a complete prohibition
prevents creative and welfare-enhancing pricing arrangements and
strategies to stimulate demand.
NRAs should not rely on ex ante rules that bar subsidies and
provide definitions that attempt to specify harmful practices. Instead,
they should provide a forum for timely resolution of complaints when
and if they arise. By law, or through NRA initiatives, regulatory
proceedings should have to conclude within a fixed time limit. For
example, the FCC has created a "rocket docket" for expedited

207.

The FCC requires telecommunications companies to pay a percentage of their

interstate end-user revenues to help support universal service funding.

The carriers pass

through to subscribers this amount, which represented 17.1 percent for the third quarter of 2017
and a proposed 18.8 percent for the fourth quarter. Proposed Fourth Quarter 2017 Universal
Service Contribution Factor, 32 FCC Rcd. 6904, 6904 (Sept. 12, 2017); Proposed Third Quarter
2017 Universal Service Contribution Factor, 32 FCC Red. 4825, 4825 (June 13, 2017).
208.
The FCC also imposes qualification requirements to conserve funds and to ensure
that only impoverished individuals receive subsidies. See Lifeline Support for Affordable
Communications, supra note 192. Individual consumers qualify by showing an income at or

below 135 percent of federal poverty guidelines or participation in certain assistance programs.
Id. The Lifeline assistance program provides a discount on monthly voice wireline or wireless
service of $9.25 per month. Id. The program also supports broadband and broadband-voice
bundles, but only with one subsidy per household. Id.
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resolutions of some complaints and disputes. 209 Additionally, the FCC
has a "shot clock" for counting down to a self-imposed (but not usually
achieved) deadline for completing a proceeding, including evaluations
of blockbuster mergers and acquisitions. 210
NRAs will continue to struggle with finding a lawful way to
impose open Internet rules calibrated to sanction only harmful quality
of service and price discrimination without creating investment
disincentives. Rather than concentrate on setting ex ante rules, they
should rely on existing dispute resolution procedures when presented
with complaints providing evidence that competitive and consumer
harms have occurred.

209.
See, e.g., Creation of Low Power Radio Service, 15 FCC Rcd. 19208, 19210, 19282
(Sept. 20, 2000) (establishing a new streamlined "rocket docket" procedure for addressing low
power FM radio station interference complaints).
210.
See, e.g., Acceleration of Broadband Deployment by Improving Wireless Facilities
Siting Policies, 29 FCC Rcd. 12865, 12866 (Oct. 21, 2014) (expediting the process for wireless
tower site negotiations with an eye toward reducing costs and delays); Informal Timeline for
Considerationof Applicationsfor Transfers or Assignments of Licenses or Authorizations Relating
to Complex Mergers, FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, https://www.fcc.gov/generallinformal-timelineconsideration-applications-transfers-or-assignments-licenses-or
[https://perma.cc/ZWX4-5P7A]
(last visited Jan. 13, 2018). But see Comprehensive Review of Licensing and Operating Rules for
Satellite Services, 30 FCC Rcd. 14713, 14823 (Dec. 17, 2015) (declining to impose a shot clock
deadline for satellite carrier orbital slot coordination).

